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Life Expectancy and Economic Growth: 
The Role of the Demographic Transition
*
 
In this paper we investigate the causal effect of life expectancy on economic growth by 
explicitly accounting for the role of the demographic transition. In addition to focusing on 
issues of empirical identification, this paper emphasizes the role of the econometric 
specification. We present a simple theory of the economic and demographic transition where 
individuals' education and fertility decisions depend on their life expectancy. The theory 
predicts that before the demographic transition improvements in life expectancy primarily 
increase population. Improvements in life expectancy do, however, reduce population growth 
and foster human capital accumulation after the onset of the demographic transition. This 
implies that the effect of life expectancy on population, human capital and income per capita 
is not the same before and after the demographic transition. Moreover, a sufficiently high life 
expectancy is ultimately the trigger of the transition to sustained income growth. We provide 
evidence supporting these predictions using data on exogenous mortality reductions in the 
context of the epidemiological revolution. 
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Across countries, high life expectancy is associated with high income per capita. But do improvements
in life expectancy cause increases in per capita income? In theory, increasing life expectancy may have
positive or negative eects. On the one hand, lower mortality may increase income per capita by in-
creasing the productivity of available resources (most notably human capital). On the other hand, lower
mortality may lead to an increase in population size. In the presence of x factors of production a
larger population tends to reduce income per capita. Evidence at the micro level points to a robust
positive causal relationship between life expectancy and human capital, see Jayachandran and Lleras-
Muney (2009).1 Recent empirical investigations on the macro level, however, come to dierent conclusions
about the causal impact of life expectancy on economic performance. Lorentzen, McMillan and Wacziarg
(2008) use cross-country (longitudinal) data and nd evidence for higher life expectancy leading to faster
economic growth.2 Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), on the other hand, nd that improvements in life
expectancy lead to some growth in aggregate incomes, but mainly trigger faster population growth, and
therefore have a negative causal eect on income per capita.
Previous empirical investigations have mainly concentrated on the problem of the econometric identi-
cation of the causal eect of life expectancy by exploiting appropriate exogenous variation.3 This paper
complements the literature by focussing on the issue of the appropriate specication of the empirical
analysis. In particular, we investigate the causal macroeconomic eect of changes in life expectancy on
growth taking into consideration endogenous changes in fertility behavior and investments in human cap-
ital which are associated with the so-called demographic transition. We show that explicitly accounting
for dierent phases of the demographic and economic transition that emerge along the development path
allows for a reconciliation of the seemingly contradictory empirical ndings.
We provide a simple theory that predicts that the causal eect of life expectancy varies across dierent
stages of demographic development. This idea is motivated by the observation that the demographic
transition represents a marked change in population dynamics, re
ected by a pronounced drop in fertility
that follows a reduction in mortality. The typical dynamics of the demographic transition are depicted in
1There is also evidence for a positive eect of health on human capital on the micro level, see e.g., Bleakley (2007), and
Bleakley and Lange (2009). See also Thomas and Frankenberg (2002) for an extensive survey.
2Findings of a positive eect of life expectancy on income per capita based on cross-country regressions are reported
by, e.g., Bloom and Sachs (1998), Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999), and Bloom et al. (2003). Using simulations based
on microeconomic estimates to infer the role of health improvements for income per capita, Shastry and Weil (2003), Weil
(2007) and Ashraf et al. (2008) also nd positive, but smaller, eects on income per capita.
3Dierent identication strategies have been proposed in the literature. Lorentzen, McMillan and Wacziarg (2008)
exploit permanent dierences in the mortality environment related to geography, climate and the potential exposure to
diseases like malaria. Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), on the other hand, exploit within-country variation in life expectancy
in terms of shocks to mortality related to the introduction of better treatments like penicillin. More details are provided
below.
1Figure 1 (which reproduces Fig. 1.1 from Chesnais, 1992, and Fig. 4.2 from Livi-Bacci, 1992).4 Initially,
both birth and death rates are high and natural population growth is low. At some point in time, A,
mortality begins to fall, while fertility still remains high. The consequence is an increase in the natural
rate of population growth.5 Fertility begins to fall only with some delay, at time B, thereby leading to a
reduction in birth rates. The reduction in fertility eventually leads to a reduction in the rate of population
growth. In the usual terminology, a country experiences a demographic transition when the natural rate
of population growth begins to fall in response to reductions in mortality and fertility. In other words, the
demographic transition is observed when the reduction in fertility is suciently pronounced to compensate














Figure 1: The Stages of the Demographic Transition
The main predictions concerning the causal eect of life expectancy for income per capita can be
illustrated by looking at Figure 1. Consider an exogenous reduction in mortality in a country during
phase [A;B]. As long as fertility rates remain high, the mortality reduction leads to an acceleration in
population growth, which, in turn, tends to reduce income per capita by increasing the population base.
The opposite eect emerges for a country that has already undergone the demographic transition and
experiences an exogenous increase in life expectancy during phase [B;C]. In this situation, a drop in
mortality accelerates the reduction in fertility thereby reducing population growth. This mechanism is
complemented by the existence of a negative relationship between fertility and human capital investments
along the process of development.6 Hence, an additional positive eect on income that works through
increased human capital and productivity becomes stronger when fertility falls in response to a drop in
mortality. Taken together, these demographic and economic mechanisms imply that a negative Malthu-
sian \population eect" may dominate the causal impact of life expectancy on income per capita until the
onset of the demographic transition, while mortality reductions have an unambiguously positive eect on
4These patterns of the demographic transition have been well documented in historical and contemporaneous context,
see also Chesnais (1992), Livi-Bacci (1992), Lee (2003), and Galor (2005).
5Notice that the picture plots crude birth and death rates, that is, the total number of births and deaths divided by the
size of the total population alive at each point in time. In the initial phase after time A, the birth rates decline slightly as
consequence of the increase in population size although total fertility is unchanged.
6See Galor and Weil (2000), Galor (2005), Soares (2005), and Cervellati and Sunde (2007).
2per capita income when population growth falls. In addition, exogenous reductions in mortality increase
the probability of triggering the demographic transition if they are large enough to bring a country out
of the \high fertility - low education trap" that characterizes pre-transitional economies.
We empirically investigate these predictions using data for the period 1940 to 2000. We adopt an
empirical specication that allows for dierent eects of life expectancy on per capita income, population
growth and education depending on whether a country is pre-transitional or post-transitional at the
beginning of the observation period in 1940. The identication of the stages of the transition follows the
classication criteria used in the demographics literature. In order to account for problems of reverse
causality and to investigate the causal eect of life expectancy on income per capita growth, we apply the
data and identication strategy suggested by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). Their instrument exploits
within-country reductions in mortality predicted by the epidemiological transition which took place after
1940, and which was exogenous to a particular country's level of economic development.
We nd that the eects of life expectancy improvements dier drastically depending on whether the
country under consideration is pre-transitional or post-transitional. In countries before the demographic
transition, the main eect of reductions in mortality is to accelerate population growth, which tends
to reduce per capita income, while there is little eect on education. In countries that have completed
the transition, however, reductions in mortality reduce population growth, accelerate human capital for-
mation and increase income per capita. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we nd a positive
and signicant eect of life expectancy on the share of educated individuals in post-transitional coun-
tries. Most countries that are pre-transitional before 1940 experience reductions in fertility around 1970,
although the eect on human capital is not signicant by 1980. By 2000, however, the eect of life
expectancy on education is positive and signicant for all countries. This is consistent with the pre-
diction of a positive but delayed response of human capital to reductions in mortality. Finally we nd
that improvements in life expectancy increase the probability of a country undergoing the demographic
transition. Taken together, the empirical evidence strongly supports the theoretical predictions.
These ndings have several implications. The results suggest a new interpretation of the existing
evidence on the role of life expectancy for development. The seemingly contradictory ndings in the
literature can be reconciled by explicitly considering the eect of mortality on fertility and education
choices. The ndings also suggest that the causal eect of life expectancy that is estimated when the
demographic transition is not accounted for, crucially depends on the composition of the sample in terms
of pre-transitional and post-transitional countries. This implies that the economic interpretation of causal
eects of life expectancy on income per capita obtained with linear specications is problematic, because
reductions in mortality in
uence the population and human capital dynamics non-linearly. Finally, the
results have implications for policy, in particular in view of the fact that most developing countries have
recently experienced the onset of the demographic transition.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical framework that helps
3illustrate the main idea. Based on this theory we develop an estimation framework and discuss its
empirical implementation in Section 3. Section 4 presents the main results, and Section 5 concludes. All
proofs are collected in the appendix.
2 Mortality, Fertility, and Income per Capita
This section presents a simple micro-founded growth model which is used to frame the empirical analysis
in the following section. The theory predicts dierent eects of mortality on (per capita) income in the
dierent phases of (demographic) development and suggests that suciently large reductions in mortality
are needed to trigger the economic and demographic transition.
2.1 Set-up
Consider a closed-economy neoclassical growth model in continuous time t along the lines of the model
studied by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). A unique consumption good is produced with a constant





where 0 <  < 1 and Lt  L denotes factors of production like physical capital or land that are taken to
be in x supply in the short and medium run.7 The aggregate human capital (or the aggregate amount
of eective units of labor) is supplied inelastically and given by,
Ht = htNt (2)
where ht denotes the individual level of human capital and Nt is the size of population. Technology (or
productivity) is captured by At.
In the short and medium run, improvements in health or life expectancy primarily in
uence total
production by aecting technology, human capital and the size of population. Denote by Tt the level of
life expectancy. In Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the role of life expectancy for total factor productivity
and human capital in reduced form is assumed to be iso-elastic
At = AT
t (3)




with   0. Reductions in mortality mechanically aect population size directly, since more people survive
7The assumption of a xed stock of physical capital is without consequence for the main results, see also the discussion
in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007).
4at each point in time, and indirectly, if the likelihood of surviving until childbearing age increases. Both
eects jointly imply that reduced mortality mechanically increases population size.8 Restricting attention
to iso-elastic specications, these mechanical eects of mortality on population can be captured as
Nt = NT
t (5)
or, in logs, lnNt = lnN + lnTt, with  > 0. The level of log per capita income is then given by
lnyt = lnAt + lnht   (1   )lnNt + (1   )lnLt : (6)
Consider for the moment the stock of Lt as being independent from life expectancy which is a reasonable
assumption in the short and medium run.9 Using (3), (4) and (5) we have
lnyt =  lnTt + Bt




  (1   )lnN and
 = ( + )   (1   ) ? 0 (7)
where  is the parameter linking log per capita income to log life expectancy. Equation (7) illustrates the
main source of ambiguity concerning the role of life expectancy for income per capita. If life expectancy
increases population size, then income per capita is reduced in the presence of xed factors of production
and decreasing marginal productivity of N. This is a negative Malthusian \population eect":  (1  
) < 0. Life expectancy, however, may have a positive \human capital" eect which tends to increase
income per capita through its eect on productivity A and the stock of human capital, ( + ) > 0.
2.2 Fertility and Population Size
The theoretical prediction of an ambiguous eect of life expectancy on per capita income, re
ected by
(7), is derived under the assumption that fertility is constant, or at least unrelated to mortality. Note
that the evolution of the population depends on the net rate of reproduction, NRR,10 which is dened
8These mechanical eects are qualitatively identical. The direct eect has only temporary consequences, however, since
it aects the level of population but not its long-run rate of growth (see Preston et al., 2001, pp. 158-159). To simplify
illustration, and since only the change in the probability of childbearing have long run eects on population growth, we
only consider this channel in our illustrative theory.
9Restricting attention to the medium run without adjustment of physical capital is without loss of generality for the
argument. As shown in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), considering a full adjustment of the capital stock only implies a
larger eect of life expectancy on income per capita growth since the constraint of a x factor of production is less binding.
This has no implications for the prediction that the population and human capital eects of changes in life expectancy are
of opposite signs before and after the demographic transition, however.
10The net reproduction rate, NRR, is the average number of daughters that would be born to a woman if she survived
through her fertile age and conformed to the age-specic fertility and mortality rates. For simplicity, we restrict to a model
of asexual reproduction, and therefore treat the net reproduction rate as the number of ospring born to a representative
individual of a cohort.
5as
NRR = np(') : (8)
The variable n denotes the total fertility rate, TFR, which measures the number of children that would
be born to an individual over her lifetime if that individual were to survive until the end of reproductive
life. The variable ' denotes the mean age of reproduction, which is also referred to as the mean length of
a generation. The probability of surviving until the (mean) age of reproduction ' is denoted by p(') and
depends on the death rates in infant, child and young ages. Equation (8) states that the natural rate of
reproduction depends on planned fertility n net of mortality up to fertile age, 1 p('). Alternatively the
NRR can be interpreted with reference to the whole population as the expected total number of children
that the representative individual has during her fertile life.
Consider an initial period t0 = 0 in which population size is given by N0. Population at time t  t0,








which implies that population grows in proportion to NRR.11 Over the course of one generation, i.e.,
when t = ', the population grows exactly by a factor NRR.
For simplicity, we keep assuming that the mechanical eect of population on life expectancy is re
ected
by an iso-elastic reduced form relationship (5), so that lnp(') = lnTt. Making use of (8) and taking
logs we can therefore rewrite condition (9) as,
lnNt = [lnN0 + ln(t=') + lnnt] + lnTt (10)
where   0 captures the mechanical eect of mortality on population for given total fertility rates.
Hence, mortality can aect the size of population by inducing changes in fertility, n, and by (mechanically)
increasing the probability of surviving to mean age of childbearing, p(').
Notice that if the total fertility rate n is constant, or independent from life expectancy, then equation
(10) is qualitatively equivalent to the formulation (5), and reductions in mortality lead to a larger rate
of population growth. If this is the only eect at work then @ lnN=@ lnT =  > 0. In general, however,
the total \population" eect implied by equation (10) depends on how life expectancy T aects the total
fertility rate n. In fact, recalling the discussion of Figure 1, the response of fertility to mortality diers
before and after the demographic transition. By its very denition, the demographic transition is identied
by the reduction in fertility rates n, which is closely linked to the (preceding) reduction in mortality rates.
In the notation of our model, a demographic transition takes place only when population growth falls in
11The evolution of population size could be equivalently expressed in terms of the implicit rate of population growth that
is necessary to increase population size by an amount NRR within a period of time '. In fact, equation (9), is the linear
version of the relationship between the population growth rate and NRR in the Lotka stable population model (see Preston
et al., 2001, p. 152).
6response to a reduction of mortality (or an increase in life expectancy), that is @ lnN=@ lnT < 0. This
is the case only when the reduction in fertility, lnn, is larger than the mechanical eect on population
size, lnT. Once an economy enters the demographic transition, the reduction in fertility rates more
than compensates the mechanical increase in population so that increases in life expectancy lead to lower
rates of population growth. This implies that after the onset of the demographic transition the predicted
eect of mortality reductions on per capita income is unambiguously positive. To obtain a more thorough
understanding of the determinants of the net reproduction rate and human capital we next incorporate
endogenous education and fertility choices into the framework.
2.3 A Simple Model of the Economic and Demographic Transition
Three main mechanisms that link changes in mortality to changes in fertility have been investigated in
the literature. The rst involves a precautionary demand for children by parents that care for the number
of children surviving to adulthood in the presence of stochastic fertility and mortality, see Kalemli-Ozcan
(2003). This precautionary demand eect is likely to be stronger in the context of mortality aecting
young adults than for child and infant mortality, because replacing children is easier than replacing adult
osprings.12 The second mechanism works through a shift from the quantity of children to their quality
in response to their increasing longevity, see, Soares (2005). The third mechanism links life expectancy
to fertility through individuals' acquisition of their own human capital, coupled with dierential fertility
between individuals with dierent education. Reductions in mortality increase the returns to investments
in (own) education, as well as the (opportunity) cost of raising children. This creates a dierential fertility
eect which materializes in a negative relationship between parental education and fertility, see Cervellati
and Sunde (2007).
These channels are likely to be jointly at work, and to complement each other, in explaining the
reduction in fertility following reductions in mortality during to the demographic transition. We illustrate
our argument by restricting attention to the third mechanism based on a dierential fertility eect. We
do this for two main reasons. First, this channel predicts a direct link between the observation of the
demographic transition (reduction in mortality and fertility) and the economic transition (the acquisition
of human capital). Second, a unique prediction that distinguishes this channel is that the reduction
in fertility may take place with some delay after the reduction in mortality, since fertility reductions
are observed only when the parent generation has completed their education and fertility. In fact, the
consideration of a possible temporal mismatch between mortality reductions and fertility reductions may
be important in interpreting empirical evidence over a time horizon of few generations.13
Consider the following simple theory of the economic and demographic transition. At each point in
12Technically, modeling this eect requires considering that parents derive utility only from children surviving to adulthood
(which depends on p(')) within a non-homothetic formulation of preferences.
13The large body of evidence on dierential fertility related to education is summarized in Skirbekk (2008).
7time t there is a continuum of individuals alive with total mass Nt, which includes individuals of dierent
cohorts. We identify cohort j by its date of birth. Members of a given age cohort j are homogeneous.
To highlight the main point in the simplest way, we restrict attention to comparing steady states within
a stable population model. In a stable population model, the net rate of reproduction can be non-zero
in the long run and is independent of the age structure, which is constant.14 Under these conditions
the total lifetime fertility of a particular member of a cohort coincides with the fertility obtained by
integrating across age cohorts at a particular point in time. This is convenient since it allows to directly
map variables relating to cohorts j into variables relating to periods t. A useful implication of this is
that for any given distribution of age specic mortality rates we have nt = nj.15 For the purpose of
conducting comparative statics with respect to life expectancy across steady states, this implies that the
optimal (lifetime) fertility behavior of a representative individual of a particular cohort can be used to
characterize the fertility behavior of the population at a given point in time. We can therefore focus
attention to studying the optimal total fertility rate nj in a representative cohort j.









The main trade-o that individuals face is about the use of available lifetime. They can invest their time
in acquiring human capital, raising children, and producing income. Denote by e 2 [0;Tj] the time that
agents spend in acquiring human capital, i.e., to increase their eective labor. We follow Cervellati and
Sunde (2005) and assume that investments in education are eective in increasing human capital only if
they are large enough. We therefore assume that individuals are endowed with a basic level of human
capital, h. If no time is invested in education, then the level of eective labor is not increased. Formal








with  2 (0;1).17
14Necessary conditions for a stable population are constant age-specic fertility and death rates, see Preston et al. (2001,
ch. 7). In the model presented below, we follow the typical assumptions in the long-run growth literature and abstract from
life cycle considerations as long as they satisfy these conditions.
15Notice that the age structure of the population is irrelevant for the main prediction that the population eect and
human capital eect of mortality change with the demographic transition. Restricting to a stable population model is
therefore without any loss of generality for the argument.
16The specication of preferences essentially follows Galor and Weil (2000), where the second component generates a link
between generations that can be interpreted as a warm glow type of altruistic preferences. Given homothetic preferences, the
optimal decisions are unaected by assuming that utility depends on (planned) fertility rather than the number of surviving
ospring or realized gross fertility. Also, it is implicitly assumed that individuals can perfectly smooth consumption as well
as the utility from children over their life, but, crucially, they cannot perfectly substitute utility from their own consumption
with utility derived from their ospring.
17This is formally equivalent to assuming that the production of human capital is characterized by a x cost in terms of




In order to model the dierential fertility associated with an individual's own education in the simplest
way, we assume that the lifetime (opportunity) cost of raising children increases for educated parents so
that and x(e) = 1 if e = 0 while x(e) = 1 + x if e > 0 with x 2 (0;1). We assume that 
 > x(1   
).
This parametric restriction implies that the returns to investments in education are large enough to
compensate for the increasing (opportunity) cost of raising children so that investing in education may
be protable. This formulation implies that educated parents face a larger opportunity cost of fertility.18
Taken together, (12) and (13) imply that the relative cost of education compared to raising children is
decreasing with life expectancy, i.e., greater life expectancy induces the acquisition of more education
and leads to lower total fertility rates nj.
To simplify matters, and since there is no inequality in resource ownership, it is assumed that all
income is distributed to human capital, so that the return to a unit of human capital equals its average
product as in Galor and Weil (2000). Denote by wj (Tj) the average wage paid to each unit of eective
human capital during the life of cohort j.19 The lifetime budget constraint is,
cj  wj (Tj)h(ej)[Tj   k(Tj)nj   ej] (14)
where wj (Tj)h(ej)Tj is the total potential lifetime income that would be earned by h(ej) units of eective















s:t: (12) and the budget constraint (14) :
We next characterize the optimal total fertility rate and the optimal investments in human capital,
and then derive the implications of reducing mortality for the patterns of the economic and demographic
transition.














education investments are protable. The equilibrium levels of human capital and fertility are given by:
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j if Tj > T :
time, e  1, which has to be covered for education to be eective, see, e.g. Cervellati and Sunde (2005).
18Notice that the acquisition of own education would also reinforce the fertility reduction in a quantity-quality framework
a la Soares (2005) if educated parents face a lower cost producing educated children.










The Lemma points out four implications of the model: 1) life expectancy must be large enough to
induce investments in human capital; 2) the total fertility rate is, ceteris paribus, lower in absolute terms
whenever the individual invests in education;20 3) education does not increase with T if Tj  T, but
education is increasing in T if Tj > T; 4) life expectancy does not aect total fertility rates as long as
Tj  T, while total fertility decreases in life expectancy if Tj > T.
In words, the optimal choice of education and fertility depends on whether the economy is character-
ized by a level of life expectancy below or above the critical level T that separates the pre-transitional and
post-transitional demographic regimes. If mortality is too high and life expectancy too low, individuals
do not nd it protable to make large investments in education. In this case, their low life expectancy
constrains individuals in their education choices.21 If life expectancy is suciently high, optimal invest-
ments in education are positive, and an increase in life expectancy leads to an increase in education
investments and to a decrease in fertility.
Recall that with time invariant age specic death rates we have nt = nj and Tt = Tj. The aggregate
level of human capital can therefore still be expressed as in (2), Ht = htNt for any t. Using the equilibrium













+  lnTt + lnNt if Tt > T













)k   xlnTt + lnTt if Tt > T
An economy experiences a demographic transition when the net population growth rate, NRR, falls
in response to reductions in mortality. From Lemma 1 and considering the expression for ln NRR, we
have,
Lemma 2. A country undergoes the demographic transition when @ lnNRR=@ lnT < 0. Hence, a demo-
graphic transition takes place if Tt > T, and if
x >  : (15)
The previous Lemma states that a necessary condition for observing a demographic transition is that
life expectancy is large enough. Condition (15) implies that, in order for a demographic transition to
be observed, the reduction in total fertility rates, n, must be larger than the mechanical increase in
20In light of the literature, this is consistent with dierential fertility across dierent education groups.
21This mechanism would be at work in a pre-transitional phase also if subsistence levels in consumption were considered,
see, e.g., Galor and Weil (2000) or de la Croix and Licandro (2009).
10population size, , as consequence of a reduction in mortality. To illustrate the role of the demographic
transition we assume that condition (15) holds.22
2.4 Eects of Life Expectancy on Population, Human Capital and Income
Recall the expression for log per capita income, (6),
lnyt = lnAt + lnht   (1   )lnNt + (1   )lnLt :
Substituting the expression for population size at t, (10), and using the iso-elastic relationship between
life expectancy and total factor productivity (3), we have
lnyt = lnA + lnTt + lnht   (1   )(lnn + lnTt)
 (1   )(lnN0 + ln(t='))(1   )lnLt
From Lemma 1 it follows that the eect of T on lnn and lnh depends on whether the country is pre-
transitional or post-transitional. In pre-transitional countries, with T  T,
lny
pre
t = lnA + lnTt + lnh   (1   )[]lnTt
 (1   )[lnN0 + ln(t=') + ln(1   
)   lnk](1   )lnLt
=  + pre lnTt   (1   )[ln(t=')] (16)




  (1   )[lnN0 + ln(1   
)   lnk](1   )lnLt and
pre =    (1   ) < (>)0 : (17)
Hence, in pre-transitional countries, a reduction in mortality increases population. The coecient pre is
therefore positive only if the externality of life expectancy on productivity A is suciently large to more
than compensate the negative population eect.
Repeating the same reasoning for post-transitional countries with T > T, we have
lny
post
t = lnA + lnTt + lnh +  lnTt +  ln[
=(1 + 
)] + (1   )[x   ]lnTt
 (1   )[lnN0 + ln(t=') + ln(1   
)   ln[(1 + 
)k]](1   )lnLt
=  + post lnTt   (1   )ln(t=') +  (18)
where  =  ln[
=(1 + 
)] + (1   )ln[(1 + 
)]. The parameter of interest is given by
post = ( + ) + (1   )[x   ] > 0 (19)
22Cervellati and Sunde (2007) present a more general theory in which lower mortality induces parents to spend more time
on their own education, thereby devoting less lifetime to work and reduce fertility. They also study the conditions under
which a demographic transition can take place and present evidence on the role of dierential fertility and mortality.
11where we assume that condition (15) holds, so that, from condition (8) the net replacement rate decreases
following the reduction in mortality, that is, the country has undergone the demographic transition.
Notice that a drop in net fertility is only a sucient but not a necessary condition for an increase in per
capita income, however. In fact, post can be positive even if net fertility has not dropped yet due to the
existence of a positive human capital eect ( + ) > 0.
We summarize the results in
Proposition 1. An increase in life expectancy T implies:
 In pre-transitional countries, [i.e., T  T]: an ambiguous eect on log per-capita income, @ lny=@ lnT <
(>) 0, a positive eect on the rate of population growth, @ lnN=@ lnT > 0, and a negligible eect
on human capital, @ lnh=@ lnT = 0;
 In post-transitional countries [i.e., Ti > T]: a positive eect on per-capita income, @ lny=@ lnT > 0,
a negative eect on the rate of population growth, @ lnN=@ lnT < 0, and a positive eect on human
capital, @ lnh=@ lnT > 0.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 1, (17) and (19).
The eect of life expectancy on per capita income goes in opposite directions in pre-transitional and
post-transitional countries. In pre-transitional countries, the main eect of an increase in life expectancy
is to increase population size rather than investments in human capital. The eect of lower mortality
on population size can dominate the eect on productivity, thereby leading to a reduction in income per
capita. In post-transitional countries, on the other hand, improvements in life expectancy lead to lower
fertility and larger investments in human capital. As a result, per-capita income increases.
Finally notice that reductions in mortality are necessary, but not sucient, conditions to induce
a demographic transition. In fact, the larger the increase in T and the closer the initial level of life
expectancy to T the more likely is that reductions in mortality trigger a transition and, consequently, an
increase in per capita income. This last prediction is summarized in,
Proposition 2. An increase in life expectancy increases the probability of observing an economic and
demographic transition.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 1.
This simple model captures three features that are central to the recent literature on the economic
and demographic transition. First, in pre-transitional economies reductions in mortality increase the rate
of population growth but have little eect on investments in human capital. Second, in post-transitional
economies, in which investments in education are already positive, improvements in longevity lead to a
reduction in fertility and to an increase in education investments. Third, an increase in life expectancy
makes a demographic transition more likely, inducing positive (and increasing) investments in education
12and reversing fertility behavior. This is particularly likely to happen once life expectancy is already fairly
large.23 The main testable predictions of the model, summarized in Propositions 1 and 2, are therefore
that increases in life expectancy have a positive eect on population growth, little eect on human capital,
and an ambiguous or even negative eect on per capita income before the demographic transition. After
the transition, the eect on population growth is negative and the eect on per capita income is positive.
Finally, reductions in mortality increase the likelihood of observing a transition.
3 Estimation Framework and Empirical Implementation
We now turn to the empirical implementation of the model and the data description.
3.1 Estimation Framework
The estimation framework directly follows from the previous derivation. As anticipated above, we restrict
attention to investigating the medium-run eects of a change in life expectancy. That is, we follow
Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) in assuming that the total capital stock K remains xed at its initial level.
As discussed above, taking into account endogenous adjustments in the capital stock leaves the main
predictions concerning opposite eects of life expectancy on per capita income for pre-transitional and
post-transitional countries unaected.
Denoting a country by subscript i, rewriting conditions (16) and (18) and adding an error term, we
obtain
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as expression for log per capita income in pre-transitional countries, that is with T < T i. For post
transitional countries T > T i log income is given by
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The time invariant, but potentially country-specic, components of the expressions that are functions
of parameters are collected in country xed eects , while time varying factors common to all pre-
transitional or post-transitional countries are collected in the time xed eects, pre and post.24 The
coecients preand post are the respective parameters of interest. As in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007),
the consideration of a long-dierence regression with two observations per country implies that the esti-
mation of the previous equations is equivalent to the estimation of the rst-dierence specications
lny
pre












23Note that the model predictions could equivalently be cast in terms of crude birth and death rates, and are therefore
consistent with the patterns depicted in Figure 1.
24In particular, the xed eects in the specication for post-transitional countries also include the term i.
13where lnT  lnT2   lnT1. The constants also depends on the time spell, that is the term
 (1   )[ln(t2)   ln(t1)] which results from taking rst dierences, where t2  t2   t0 and t1 
t1   t0, in both pre-transitional and post-transitional countries.
Recall that from the theory we would expect pre ? 0 and post > 0 and that the dierence between
the two essentially depends on the dierent human capital and fertility levels. In fact, notice that if h were
assumed to be generically iso-elastic in T as in (4) and n were taken to be unrelated to life expectancy,
then (17) and (19) would collapse to equation (7),
pre = post =  = ( + )   (1   ) ? 0 ; (22)
which coincides with the coecient estimated by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). This provides the pos-
sibility for a direct test of whether the incorporation of considerations about the demographic transition
are empirically relevant.
3.2 Data and Empirical Implementation
The main outcome variables of interest for the empirical investigation are GDP, GDP per capita, pop-
ulation size and human capital; the main explanatory variable of interest is life expectancy at birth.25
The estimation of the causal eects of life expectancy uses the predicted mortality instrument proposed
by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). This instrument exploits information on the reduction in mortality
following the epidemiological transition in the 1940s to predict the mortality decline. Three components
of the epidemiological transition motivate this instrument: the wave of drug and chemical innovations
that led to eective vaccines and medicines for major diseases (like vaccines for yellow fever, antibiotics,
or chemicals like DDT); the establishment of international institutions like the WHO or UNICEF that fa-
cilitated the distribution of medical and public health technology; and, nally, the change in international
values leading to a fast dissemination of medical knowledge. Importantly, as consequence of the global
character of these innovations, the exclusion restriction { that the instrument is exogenous to a particular
country's level of development and does not aect income or population through other channels than life
expectancy { appears valid.26 The base sample consists of 47 countries for which all relevant data on the
predicted mortality instrument, life expectancy, and outcome variables on the second stage are available
for 1940 and 1980 (or 2000). In further investigations of the human capital channel we also use data
on the population share without schooling and on the average years of schooling in the population of
25The essential data sources are the UN Demographic Yearbook, and Maddison (2003), see Acemoglu and Johnson (2007)
for details.
26Essentially, the exclusion restriction in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) is based on the fact that no treatment or vaccine
existed worldwide for the main killer diseases as of 1940, such that mortality due to these diseases depended on country-
specic features, but not on income. Also, due to the nature of the epidemiological transition, i.e., due to the discovery and
the world-wide dissemination of drugs and vaccines, mortality from these diseases dropped to the world frontier by 1980 in
all countries.
14working age constructed by Soto and Cohen (2007).
Following Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), we estimate the models (20) and (21) in long dierences,
i.e., using panel data with only two observations per country, (1940 and 1980, or 1940 and 2000). The
choice of a forty years horizon is justied by the fact that changes in fertility behavior and investments
in human capital are likely to take place over the course of generations and, therefore, need a suciently
long observation period to take place and to be detected. Changes in life expectancy that take place
at some point in time after 1940 are expected to aect fertility and education decisions in the following
decades and should be captured by 1980 or 2000, but potentially not before.
According to Proposition 1, an empirical specication should explicitly discriminate between countries
which are pre-transitional and post-transitional in order to identify the eect of improvements in life
expectancy. Ideally, one would take into account when the mortality reduction treatment is applied to
a country and whether the country is pre-transitional or post-transitional at the time of treatment. In
principle, the available data on fertility and realized mortality do allow for a fairly precise identication
of the onset of the demographic transition within a range of about ten years (see the discussion below).
However, the data on the predicted mortality instrument only contain country-specic information for
the predicted change in mortality over the full period.
We therefore consider a classication of countries into pre-transitional and post-transitional as of 1940,
i.e., before the treatment in terms of the mortality reduction due to the epidemiological revolution took
place. Countries can be classied as pre-transitional or post-transitional according to several alternative
criteria. We use the three main criteria that have been used in the demography literature to identify the
demographic transition, see, e.g., Chesnais (1992, p. 19). First, a country is considered post transitional
when mortality is suciently low. The usual threshold for life expectancy at birth is taken to be fty
years. Second, the onset of the demographic can be identied by the drop in fertility. The second criterion
therefore identies the period from which on fertility, or the crude birth rate, exhibits a sustained decline.
Third, a country is post-transitional if the crude birth rates is suciently low. The typical threshold is
taken to be around 30 births per 1000 inhabitants. According to these criteria, we consider a country
to be post-transitional if, before the epidemiological revolution, that is before 1940, the following criteria
are satised:
1. life expectancy at birth exceeds 50;
2. fertility or the crude birth rate has already exhibited a sustained decline;
3. the crude birth rate has fallen below the threshold of 30/1000.27
27As discussed below, for robustness we also consider the threshold of 25/1000 which, however, is more restrictive and
fragile to short term 
uctuations in birth rates like, e.g., the baby boom. Likewise, we also considered a less restrictive
threshold of 35/1000. All results are qualitatively identical.
15The rst requirement is expected to be, on average, the least restrictive one in dening post-transitional
countries because the drop in mortality precedes the drop in fertility (often substantially). The second
requirement, in turn, is less restrictive than the third criterion since it classies a country as post-
transitional when the sustained fertility reduction has started although the process may not be complete
(so that the crude birth rate may be still above 30/1000).
In the following we classify a country depending on whether it was already post-transitional before
the treatment was applied, i.e., in 1940, by considering each one of the three requirements. To verify
the second requirement we follow Reher (2004) and consider a country to be post transitional if it has
entered the falling trend in terms of the 5-year averages of crude birth rates by the year 1935. It turns
out that, in the sample of countries considered by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the application of each
of the three dierent criteria leads to the same classication of countries. This classication delivers 25
pre-transitional and 22 post-transitional countries in 1940, i.e. before the onset of the epidemiological
revolution. This classication also coincides with the one proposed by Reher (2004) using the second
requirement only. Exceptions are Greece, Ireland and New Zealand, which are not classied in Reher
(2004).28 In our baseline classication we consider these three countries as post-transitional in 1940
since they clearly satisfy requirements 1 and 3. Nonetheless, for robustness we also use the alternative
classication and consider them as pre-transitional (Criterion 2a). As a second robustness check we also
consider a more restrictive requirement and classify the countries as post transitional only if, together
with requirements 1 and 2, the crude birth rate in 1940 is below 25/1000 (Criterion 3a). This is the most
restrictive criterion and delivers 31 pre-transitional countries and only 16 post-transitional countries. In
this case Argentina, Canada, Finland, the Netherland, New Zealand and Portugal are also classied
as pre-transitional in 1940. For a graphical illustration of the demographic dynamics underlying these
criteria, Figure 2 in the Appendix depicts the crude birth rates of all 47 countries in our sample over the
period 1940-2000.
Finally, for comparability, we also apply the classication of Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) according
to which countries are grouped by initial income in 1940 (rich and non-rich countries). This classication
can also be justied in view of the fact that the economic and demographic transitions tend to be
closely related. It is important to notice, however, that this classication does not directly relate to the
theoretical argument based on the demographic transition presented above, since the level of income does
not perfectly coincide with the stages of the demographic transition. This implies that the classication
in terms of rich and non rich countries cannot, strictly speaking, be interpreted in line of the theory
presented above.29 The classication of countries according to all these criteria is listed in Table 12 in
the appendix.
28In the case of Greece the problem is the lack of reliable data before 1950. Ireland and New Zealand display a very 
at
prole of crude birth rates around 30/1000 after 1940 and a clear drop only in 1980 and 1960 respectively.
29For example in 1940 several European countries are classied as non rich although they are clearly post-transitional.
16We apply the three classication criteria also in 1980 (and 2000). This allows us to distinguish
countries that entered the demographic transition (the fertility decline) during the observation window
1940-1980 (and 1940-2000), from countries that remained fully pre-transitional throughout the observa-
tion window. We use these classications for further robustness, and in order to investigate the prediction
stated in Proposition 2 that reductions in mortality should facilitate the demographic transition in the
countries that are still pre-transitional in 1940. As expected all post-transitional countries in 1940 remain
post transitional during the entire observation window, while some countries undergo the demographic
transition (see below for more details on this classication). Table 13 reports the baseline classica-
tion of the countries into post-transitional, intermediate (undergoing the transition between 1940 and
1980), and pre-transitional throughout 1940-1980, together with the two robustness classications and
the classication in rich and non rich countries.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the variables of interest for the estimation. The base sample
corresponds to the base sample investigated by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). Compared to the base
sample, in which average life expectancy at birth is 49.3 years in 1940, average life expectancy in in
pre-transitional countries is only 38.8 years, while in post-transitional countries it equals 61.2 years. By
1980, average life expectancy has increased to 67.6 years, with substantial convergence across the two
samples: life expectancy at birth is 62.3 years in pre-transitional countries, while in post-transitional
countries, life expectancy is 73.7 by 1980.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 The Eect of Life Expectancy in Pre and Post Transitional Countries
Preliminary Analysis. To gain a visual impression of the demographic dynamics in post-transitional
and pre-transitional countries, we begin by graphing the dynamic evolution of the average crude death
rates, crude birth rates and natural rate of population growth. Figure 3(a) depicts these variables for the
countries which are already post-transitional before 1940.30 In these countries the death rates are about
12/1000 in 1940, decline by about 25 percent until 1960, and stabilize afterwards.31 The crude birth rate
and the net rate of population growth decline by about 50 percent by 1980 and keep decreasing until year
2000.
Figure 3(b) plots the respective series for countries which are still pre-transitional in 1940. As ex-
pected, for this group of countries both death and birth rates are larger in 1940. The average crude death
rate in 1940 is almost 20/1000 and displays a clear negative trend. Death rates are reduced by about
30The lines re
ect the average of the respective variables for countries classied as post-transitional according to the rst
column of Table 12. The shaded area represents 95 percent condence intervals.
31In fact, life expectancy at birth keeps increasing although the crude death rate stabilizes due to the increase in the
share of elderly in these countries.
1750 percent in 1970 when they reach 10/1000, which is about the average death rate of post transitional
countries in 1940. After 1970, death rates drop by about 20 percent in the next twenty years and even-
tually stabilize. The crude birth rate is essentially unchanged until 1960 and displays a sizable decline
only after 1970. Accordingly, the natural rate of population growth is initially increasing and display a
sustained decline only after 1970. By 1990, the natural population growth rate is about the same as in
1940.
Figure 3 illustrates the dierent phases of the demographic transition. Reductions in mortality breed
larger population growth until the onset of the demographic transition, but this trend is reversed after-
wards and turns negative for post-transitional countries. It is noteworthy that only after 1970 the time
series of pre-transitional countries resemble those of countries which are already post-transitional in 1940.
To gain further visual impression of the time series patterns of the variables of interest, Figure 4
depicts the time series of average log income per capita and log population in post-transitional and
pre-transitional countries, respectively. The gure illustrates the smaller increase in population size in
post-transitional countries compared to pre-transitional countries. At the same time, the increase in log
income per capita is less pronounced in pre-transitional countries. The dierence in the slopes of the
series of income and population for the two groups appears larger before 1980 than afterwards.
Figure 5 depicts the change in log GDP per capita from 1940 to 1980 (panel a), and from 1940 to
2000 (panel b) against the change in log life expectancy at birth over the respective period, separately for
pre-transitional and post-transitional countries. It appears that pre-transitional countries experienced
larger increases in life expectancy, but that a larger increase in life expectancy was associated with a
lower growth in gdp per capita. In contrast, among post-transitional countries, larger improvements in
life expectancy were associated with faster growth in income per capita, as indicated by the positive
slope of the regression line. This provides a rst indication for the importance of distinguishing between
pre-transitional and post-transitional countries when investigating the eect of life expectancy on growth.
Since life expectancy might be endogenous to economic development, Figure 6 provides scatter plots
of the reduced form relationship between Acemoglu and Johnson's (2007) instrument, the predicted
mortality reductions due to the epidemiological transition, and changes in life expectancy, log population
and GDP per capita from 1940 to 1980 (left panels) and from 1940 to 2000 (right panels). Notice that
the predicted mortality variable implies that a more negative realization (a larger drop in mortality) is
associated with a larger increase in life expectancy. Panels (a) and (b) illustrate visually that larger
predicted mortality reductions are indeed positively correlated to changes in life expectancy in both pre
and post transitional countries. Panels (c) and (d) show that log population is decreasing with predicted
mortality reductions in post-transitional countries, while population remains large and even growing in
pre-transitional countries. The dierential eect of life expectancy on population growth in pre and
post transitional countries is larger over the longer time horizon as illustrated in Panel (d). Panels (e)
and (f) show that the changes in log GDP per capita are large and increasing in predicted mortality in
18post-transitional countries, while they are lower and decreasing in predicted mortality in pre-transitional
countries.
Next, we present OLS results for the eects of changes in life expectancy on log GDP per capita as
dependent variable in Table 2. Panel (A) collects the results for the period 1940-1980, while Panel (B)
shows results for the longer horizon 1940-2000. The overall coecient of life expectancy obtained for the
entire sample is negative, irrespective of the time horizon, as is shown in column (1). When splitting
the sample into pre-transitional and post-transitional countries, however, the eect is generally negative
and fairly weak for pre-transitional countries, but positive and highly signicant for post-transitional
countries. This pattern emerges for all dierent classication criteria, and over both time horizons.
The coecient is opposite when considering log population as dependent variable, see Table 3, since life
expectancy is positively associated to population growth in pre-transitional countries, but the correlation
is negative (but not signicant) in post-transitional countries. These estimates provide rst evidence
in favor of the dierent eects depending on the onset of the demographic transition predicted by the
theory. However, these ndings have to be interpreted with caution because of the obvious endogeneity
problems with regards to life expectancy.
Causal Eect of Life Expectancy on Income and Population. In order to circumvent these
problems and to estimate eects that can be interpreted causally, we adopt the identication strategy
based on the mortality change that can be attributed to the epidemiological transition as instrument,
suggested by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). Reduced form estimates using this instrument rather than
log life expectancy as primary regressor of interest reveal a similar pattern as the OLS results.
Table 4 presents the main results concerning the causal eect of life expectancy for GDP per capita
as dependent variable, using the predicted mortality change instrument. Again, panel (A) contains
estimation results for the base sample with observations in 1940 and 1980, while Panel (B) contains
results for the period 1940 to 2000. Column (1) replicates the analysis by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007).
The average eect of an increase in life expectancy, instrumented by predicted mortality reductions, on
income per capita is signicantly negative. The explanation for this nding can be seen in column (1) of
the respective panels of Tables 5 and 6: An increase in life expectancy overall signicantly increases the
population, but only has a weak and insignicant eect on aggregate GDP.
Columns (2) and (3) show the results for the sub-samples of countries that are pre-transitional and
post-transitional by 1940. We nd a signicant positive eect of life expectancy on GDP per capita for
the post-transitional countries. This eect is almost twice as large, but of the opposite sign, compared
to the average eect obtained with the pooled sample. For pre-transitional countries, the eect of an
increase in life expectancy on GDP per capita is negative. This eect is larger than the eect obtained
with the pooled sample, but it is insignicant. Notice, however, that the standard errors of the coecient
estimates for this group of countries are fairly large.
19Columns (4) and (5) report the results using the alternative classication criterion 2a according to
which Greece, Ireland and New Zealand are classied as pre-transitional in 1940. The same pattern
emerges and this classication leaves the results for post-transitional countries unchanged. The negative
eect on pre-transitional countries is now signicant at the 10 percent level.
Columns (6) and (7) report the results for the sample with the most restrictive classication based
on birth rates below 25/1000. The results are qualitatively identical. The eect of an increase in life
expectancy is signicantly negative only for pre-transitional countries, while it is signicantly positive for
post-transitional countries. Interestingly, the eects become quantitatively smaller the more restrictive
the criterion for selecting post-transitional countries. The point estimates tend to converge towards the
average eect of -1.32. This is consistent with the fact that, with this classication, some of the pre-
transitional countries enter the fertility decline soon after 1940, with the consequence of a slow-down of
population growth and a positive eect on income per capita.
Finally, when countries are classied in terms of their initial income levels, see columns (8) and (9), the
results are qualitatively similar. As shown by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the eect of life expectancy
on income per capita is signicantly negative for the poor and middle income countries. For completeness
we include also the eect for rich countries, which is positive. It should be noted, however, that strictly
speaking these results cannot be directly interpreted in light of the theoretical argument on the role of
the demographic transition. Nonetheless they provide another indication for the heterogenous eect of
reduced mortality.
Panel B of Table 4 displays the results for the longer observation period 1940-2000. The results are
essentially identical to those in panel A, but the coecient estimates are generally larger. This implies
that the results on the dierent eects of life expectancy on per capita GDP in pre-transitional and
post-transitional countries are not driven by the length of the observation period.
Compared to the OLS estimates in Table 2, the IV estimates deliver coecients that are of the same
sign and that are similar or even slightly larger in absolute magnitude across all specications. The
dierences between OLS and IV results tend to be larger for pre-transitional countries. This is conrmed
by Hausman-type endogeneity tests that reject the null of exogeneity of log life expectancy in the pooled
sample and in the pre-transitional samples of columns (1), (2), (4) and (6) at conventional levels. However,
the null of exogeneity cannot be rejected for the samples of post-transitional countries in specications
(3), (5), and (7).32 One possible explanation for this nding is that life expectancy is measured with
larger errror in the sample of pre-transitional countries, and that the instrumentation helps reducing the
incidence of attenuation bias particularly in this sample.33
The lower parts of the two panels of Table 4 depict test statistics for the rst stage performance of the
32The null of exogeneity can be rejected for both income samples, columns (8), and (9). Detailed results are available
upon request.
33On this point see also Lorentzen et al. (2008, p. 103).
20instrument (F-statistics of excluded instruments and Shea's partial R-square statistics). As consequence
of the small sample sizes in the split samples, the rst stage partial F of the instrument becomes smaller,
but, by and large, the instrument performs fairly well, as was to be expected already from the extensive
tests provided by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). The Shea's partial R-square statistic is reasonably high,
usually around 0.3 or above, indicating that the instrument explains a substantial part of the variation
in the instrumented variable.34
Another way of investigating the role of the demographic transition for the eects of life expectancy
on per capita income is to apply Chow tests of the null that the coecient of life expectancy is the same
in the sub-samples of pre-transitional and post-transitional countries, i.e., testing whether pre = post
as in condition (22). The advantage is that these tests are performed on a nested model, which makes
the results more robust and directly comparable to the results obtained from the pooled sample.35 The
test statistics from these tests are reported in the bottom part of each panel of Table 4 and indicate that,
with one exception in panel (A) where the estimate for the pre-transitional countries is very imprecise,
the null of equal coecients can be rejected at conventional levels.36 This provides further evidence in
support of the theoretical prediction that the eect of life expectancy is not the same in pre-transitional
and post-transitional countries.
Table 5 shows the eect of life expectancy on population. The eect appears to be overall negative
in post-transitional countries and positive in pre-transitional countries, regardless of the classication
criterion. The eects are also more signicant over the longer period 1940-2000 (panel B).37 Finally,
Table 6 shows that the eect of total GDP tends to be positive in post transitional countries and negative
in pre-transitional countries, but the eect is usually not statistically signicant.38
Causal eect of Life Expectancy on Education. The theory also predicts a dierent eect
of life expectancy on income per capita due to the correlation between investments in education and
fertility. From Proposition 1, life expectancy leads to higher education and lower fertility after the
onset of the transition. Life expectancy is expected to have little causal eect on education until the
onset of the transition, however. In other words, life expectancy has strong eects on education when it
34The only exception is the pre-transitional sample according to the specication in column (2).
35It should be noted that the coecient estimates for log life expectancy for pre-transitional and post-transitional countries
obtained with the nested specication are identical to those obtained with split samples.
36The rst stage performance of the instrument is stronger in the nested sample with respective partial F statistics for
excluded instruments being in the proximity 10.
37Complementary evidence of a negative relationship between life expectancy and fertility during the demographic tran-
sition is found by Kalemli-Ozcan (2006) in the context of reductions in longevity due to the HIV/AIDS epidemics in
Africa.
38In fact, repeating the analysis and restricting attention to observation periods that follow the (average) fertility drop,
such as 1970-2005, the causal eect of life expectancy on GDP per capita becomes insignicant and the coecient becomes
very small for pre-transitional countries. This suggests that the countries that had not entered the demographic transition
by 1940 appear to benet from improvements in life expectancy only later on. Detailed results are available upon request.
21simultaneously leads to reductions in fertility. The eect of life expectancy on education should therefore
be large and positive in countries that are post-transitional in 1940, but can be small in countries that
are pre-transitional in 1940.
As preliminary investigation we run again OLS estimates of the eect of life expectancy on education.
Data for education are available from 1960. Table 7 reports the estimates of the eect of life expectancy
on the share of population of more than 15 years of age without any formal schooling.39 Panel (A) reports
the eect of changes in life expectancy in 1940-1980 on the change in the share of population without
schooling in 1960-1980. The eect is negative and signicant for all countries. The eect is stronger
over the time horizon 1960-2000 as shown in panels (B) and (C) (which measure the change in education
over the horizon 1960-2000 using variation in life expectancy between 1940 and 1980 or 1940 and 2000,
respectively).
The corresponding IV estimates are reported in Table 8. The average eect is negative and signicant
over all time horizons. Panel (A) shows that by 1980 the eect is strong and signicant only in post-
transitional countries. In Panel (B) the eect turns positive by 2000 although it is slightly lower in
pre-transitional than in post transitional countries. The only exception is column (7) where the eect is
signicant also for pre-transitional countries by 1980 and where over the longer period the eect is larger
in pre-transitional than in post-transitional countries. This is to be expected since this classication
considers only the set of countries which are post transitional in 1940 according to most restrictive
criteria. The eect on the share of non educated individuals is lower since this share is already very
low in 1940 in these post-transitional countries. Panel (C) reports the overall eect considering also the
change in life expectancy until 2000. In this case the average eect is very similar for all countries. In
line with the predictions, the ndings suggest a delayed response of education to reductions in mortality
in pre-transitional countries which is sizable only over the longer horizon, i.e., when the demographic
transition is completed. Similar ndings emerge when looking at the changes in the share of population
with no schooling aged 25 and above.40
Another prediction of Proposition 1 concerns the relationship between average years of education
and life expectancy. Life expectancy has no eect on average years of schooling before the demographic
transition, while average years of schooling increase proportionally with life expectancy after the demo-
graphic transition. Repeating the analysis for average years of schooling in the population of working age
(15-64), reveals patterns that are consistent with these predictions. The causal eect of life expectancy
is generally positive and signicant for post-transitional countries but statistically not dierent from zero
in pre-transitional countries. This is true in particular when looking at longer time horizons (1960-2000),
39The data are taken from Soto and Cohen (2007). Similar results obtain for the widely used data provided by Barro
and Lee (2001) and are available upon request.
40The results are reported in the Appendix in Table 15. The main dierence is that the eect on pre-transitional countries
is less signicant even by 2000. This is to be expected since this measure excludes all individuals aged 15 to 25 by 2000
which are the cohorts most likely aected by the reduction in fertility of the late seventies.
22in line with the view that average years of schooling increases with the level of life expectancy.41
4.2 Life Expectancy and the Demographic Transition
According to Proposition 2, reductions in mortality can trigger a demographic transition if they lead to
a suciently large level of life expectancy. That some pre-transitional countries undergo a demographic
transition during the observation period is suggested already by Figure 3.
As rst investigation of the strength of the eects in countries that undergo the transition, we split the
sample of pre-transitional countries into countries that satisfy the criteria of a post-transitional country
by the end of the observation period in 1980 (or 2000). This is done to further investigate the role
of the demographic transition and as a robustness exercise. Dierently from the classication which
is obtained by applying the criteria in 1940, however, the consideration of intermediate countries that
undergo the transition between 1940 and 1980 diers depending on the particular classication criterion
that is applied.42 Correspondingly, one can consider three dierent ways of dening intermediate and
pre-transitional countries over the horizon 1940-1980 (or 1940-2000, respectively). We report the results
for the classications obtained applying each of the three criteria separately.43
Table 9 presents results for GDP per capita separately for the countries that are already post-
transitional in 1940 (which are the same post-transitional countries as before), for countries undergoing
the transition between 1940 and 1980, and for countries which remain pre-transitional until 1980. Coun-
tries can be classied as intermediate or pre-transitional if they display a life expectancy less than 50
years in 1940, but greater than 50 years (or still below 50 years) in 1980 or 2000 (columns (1), (2) and
(3)). Alternatively, countries can be classied intermediate according to whether they exhibit a sustained
decline in fertility by 1980 or 2000 (columns (4), (5) and (6)).44 We consider crude birth rates below
30/1000 in columns (7), (8) and (9). Finally, for robustness, columns (10)-(12) display the results for the
alternative criterion 2a.
Panel A of Table 9 reports the results for GDP per capita in the period 1940-1980. Panel B extends
the estimation until 2000. Finally, Panel C considers the eects on growth of GDP per capita in 1940-
41See Table 16 for details. The fact that the demographic transition is typically associated with a rapid change in the
composition of the population and a lower medium run eect on average years of schooling has been studied in more detail
in Cervellati and Sunde (2007).
42As discussed above, the dierent criteria tend to capture somewhat dierent phases of the demographic transition. It is
likely that these criteria lead to the same classication for 1940 since most of post transitional countries in 1940 did undergo
the transition in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
43Dening a country as intermediate if it satises all three criteria by 1980 delivers results similar to the most restrictive
criterion of crude birth rates below 30/1000.
44The requirement of sustained fertility decline corresponds to the rened classication proposed by Reher, who denes
countries that entered the fertility decline between 1950 and 1964 as \followers", and countries that entered the fertility
decline between 1965 and 1979 as \trailers". Countries for which the fertility decline only began after 1980 are classied as
\latecomers".
232000, classifying the demographic transitions which take place from 1940 to 2000. Table 10 reports
the corresponding results for population as dependent variable. The ndings are consistent with the
previous results: post-transitional countries benet most, in terms of GDP per capita, from an increase
in life expectancy. The eect on GDP per capita for countries undergoing the transition in the period of
observation is typically insignicant although it tends to be negative and larger in absolute size than the
average eect for the full set of pre-transitional countries (as reported in Table 4). In fact, recall that at
the onset of the transition fertility remains large. As illustrated in Figure 1 the natural population growth
rate is largest for countries around time B, i.e., just when they are about to undergo the demographic
transition, larger than than for countries that are still fully pre-transitional, i.e., in time A. Therefore it
is to be expected that largest cumulative increase in population is displayed by countries undergoing the
transition in the observation period. Table 10 shows that, irrespective of the classication, the increase
in population growth is largest for countries undergoing the transition. This translates in the largest
negative population eect on income per capita.
Finally, we investigate the prediction of Proposition 2 that increases in life expectancy might be causal
for triggering the demographic and economic transition. We estimate linear probability models with the
binary variable whether or not a country has undergone the demographic transition, using the same
identication strategy based on the predicted mortality instrument as before.45 The dependent variable
now takes value 1 if a country passes from being pre-transitional to being post transitional in 1980 (or
2000) and it takes value 0 otherwise. Note that the instrumentation strategy should still be valid in
this context, as the exclusion restriction that the instrument (the predicted drop in mortality due to
the epidemiological revolution) is exogenous to the outcome of interest (the probability to undergo the
demographic transition) and aects the outcome through no other channel than through its eect on life
expectancy is still satised.
The results are displayed in Table 11. Panel A contains results for undergoing the transition during
the observation period 1940-1980, while panel B shows results for the period 1940-2000. Column (1)
shows that an increase in life expectancy signicantly increases the probability of a country that has life
expectancy at birth below 50 years in 1940 to undergo a transition to life expectancy above 50 by 1980
(panel A) or by 2000 (panel B). Similar results obtain for a transition in terms of entering a phase of a
sustained fertility drop, see column (2). Concerning a transition in crude birth rates, the eect is positive
but insignicant over the shorter horizon, but positive and signicant over the longer horizon. This
might have to do with the fact that according to this criterion only 8 countries undergo the transition
between 1940 and 1980, but 20 countries undergo the transition by 2000. Column (4) presents the results
for the alternative criterion of a sustained fertility drop, 2a. Overall, the increase in life expectancy
appears to signicantly increase the probability that a country undergoes the demographic transition.
This is especially true for the less restrictive criteria of reaching life expectancy above 50 and displaying
45Results for Probit models are qualitatively identical and available upon request.
24a sustained fertility decline by 1980 or 2000. Fewer countries reach birth rates below 30/1000 in the
respective observation period, and according to this requirement the eect of increasing life expectancy
on the probability of observing a transition is positive but less signicant. Finally, Column (5) presents a
robustness check based on a more restrictive criterion of a country coded as pre-transitional by criteria 1,
2, and 3 making a substantial transition of crude birth rates falling below 25/1000. The coecients are
insignicant, however, most likely due to the small number of countries making the transition according
to this fairly restrictive criterion.
4.3 Discussion
Before concluding we brie
y discuss our nding of a heterogeneous causal eect of life expectancy during
the dierent phases of the demographic transition.
As mentioned in the introduction, estimates of the eect of life expectancy on income per capita are
generally lower on the macro level compared to the to the evidence based on micro data, and sometimes
even of the opposite sign. One reason for these dierences might be that macro data capture general
equilibrium eects, like the role of population size, or externalities. A Malthusian eect related to the
increase in population growth is indeed the main explanation proposed by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007)
for the negative eect of life expectancy on income per capita. Our ndings suggest that, in line with
the nonlinear population dynamics associated with the demographic transition, the general equilibrium
eects depend on the stages of the demographic transition. In fact, in post-transitional countries we nd
a large and positive eect of life expectancy on income per capita, which is not only associated with an
increase in human capital but also with a slow down in the rate of population growth.
Another issue concerns the possibility of measurement error aecting aggregate measures of life ex-
pectancy in the cross-country context, which may bias coecient estimates towards zero. A particular
problem arises when life expectancy is measured with more error in underdeveloped countries.46 This
implies that the problem of measurement error is likely to be more pervasive in pre-transitional countries
as of 1940. Consequently, the estimated causal eect of life expectancy in pre-transitional countries is
more likely to suer from attenuation bias than the estimates for post-transitional countries, as is also
indicated by the larger discrepancies between OLS and IV results for pre-transitional countries. It is
important to note, however, that this does not aect the nding of dierent signs of the causal eect for
pre-transitional and post-transitional countries, but suggests, if anything, that the estimates are more
46For example, vital statistics on which life tables, and hence data on life expectancy, are based are often incomplete
or missing. These measurement and registration problems are particularly severe in countries where the vital registration
system is decient, where a sizable proportion of the population has never attended school, or in countries where infant
mortality is very high, see, e.g., United Nations (1983, p.2). As consequence, errors associated with the indirect projection
measures that are used to produce life tables might be more severe in developing countries, i.e., countries that are pre-
transitional as of 1940.
25reliable for post-transitional countries.
Finally, life expectancy at birth is aected by both infant mortality as well as mortality at later ages.
In theory, education decisions are primarily determined by adult longevity.47 If the variation in aggregate
data on life expectancy at birth is largely driven by changes in child mortality, one may expect only little
eects on human capital formation.48 This argument could provide a complementary explanation for our
nding that human capital is mostly aected by life expectancy after the demographic transition, if most
of the increase in life expectancy in pre-transitional countries is due to reductions in child mortality.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper proposed a simple theory predicting that increases in life expectancy mainly increase popu-
lation size until the onset of the demographic transition, which tends to reduce per capita income. The
eect is opposite after the transition, when life expectancy leads to an increase of income per-capita. The
theory also predicts that improvements in life expectancy are important triggers of the transition. As a
result, the causal eect of life expectancy on income per capita is likely to dier systematically during
the dierent phases of economic and demographic development.
We empirically investigate these predictions by explicitly accounting for whether countries have un-
dergone the demographic transition already before the exogenous reductions in mortality. We nd that
increases in life expectancy increase population growth, aect human capital little and therefore tend to
reduce income per capita in pre-transitional countries. Life expectancy, however, leads to lower population
growth, greater human capital and strongly increases income per capita in post-transitional countries. On
average, countries which are pre-transitional in 1940 undergo the transition around 1970. Accordingly,
for these countries the eect of life expectancy on education is not signicant by 1980 but is positive and
signicant by 2000. We also nd evidence supporting the second theoretical prediction that greater life
expectancy increases the likelihood of a country undergoing the demographic transition. The ndings ap-
pear to be robust to applying alternative criteria for distinguishing pre-transitional and post-transitional
countries, and over dierent time horizons.
The results may help reconcile the seemingly contradictory ndings in the literature. In the presence
of non-linear dynamics of population and human capital in response to reductions in mortality, the (local)
average treatment eect of life expectancy strongly depends on the sample composition in terms of the
relative numbers of pre-transitional and post-transitional countries in the estimation sample. Our esti-
mates suggest that the eect of life expectancy was signicant and positive for post-transitional countries
in the period 1940-2000. Nonetheless, if the sample contains countries that are still predominantly pre-
47See Soares (2005) and Cervellati and Sunde (2007) for theories studying the dierent eects of child mortality and adult
longevity on human capital and fertility.
48This issue has been raised by Lorentzen et al. (2008) and Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009), among others.
26transitional or just about to undergo the demographic transition in the observation period, life expectancy
may have weak or even negative causal eects on income per capita in the pooled sample.
The results also have potentially important implications for policy interventions. Given that most
countries by now have made progress towards a demographic transition, the average causal eect of
improvements in life expectancy on per capita income is likely to be positive for health innovations and
mortality reductions if applied today. The results presented above also provide evidence for pronounced
increases in population size especially around the onset of the transition. This should be taken into
account when devising interventions aimed at reducing mortality. Finally the results suggest that the
causal eect of life expectancy actually triggering the transition should be taken into consideration when
analyzing the economic returns of improvements in life expectancy.
27References
Acemoglu, D., and S. Johnson (2007): \Disease and Development: The Eect of Life Expectancy on
Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, 115(6), 925{985.
Ashraf, Q. H., A. Lester, and D. N. Weil (2008): \When Does Improving Health Raise GDP?,"
mimeo, Brown University.
Barro, R. J., and J. Lee (2001): \International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and
Implications," Oxford Economic Papers, 53(3), 541{563.
Bleakley, H. (2007): \Desease and Development: Evidence from Hookworm Eradication in the Amer-
ican South," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(1), 73{117.
Bleakley, H., and F. Lange (2009): \Chronic Disease Burden and the Interaction of Education,
Fertility, and Growth," Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(1), 52{65.
Bloom, D. E., D. Canning, and J. Sevilla (2003): The Demographic Dividend. RAND, Santa
Monica.
Bloom, D. E., and J. D. Sachs (1998): \Geography, Demography, and Economic Growth in Africa,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 207{273.
Cervellati, M., and U. Sunde (2005): \Human Capital, Life Expectancy, and the Process of Devel-
opment," American Economic Review, 95(5), 1653{1672.
(2007): \Human Capital, Mortality and Fertility: A Unied Theory of the Economic and
Demographic Transition," IZA Discussion Paper, 2905.
Chesnais, J.-C. (1992): The Demographic Transition: Stages, Patterns and Economic Implications. A
Longitudinal Study of Sixty-Seven Countries Covering the Period 1720-1984. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
de la Croix, D., and O. Licandro (2009): \The Child is Father of the Man: Implications for the
Demographic Transition," mimeo, EUI Florence.
Gallup, J. L., J. D. Sachs, and A. D. Mellinger (1999): \Geography and Economic Development,"
International Regional Science Review, 22(2), 179{232.
Galor, O. (2005): \From Stagnation to Growth: Unied Growth Theory," in Handbook of Economic
Growth, ed. by P. Aghion, and S. Durlauf, chap. 4. Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam.
Galor, O., and D. N. Weil (2000): \Population, Technology, and Growth: From Malthusian Stagna-
tion to the Demographic Transition and Beyond," American Economic Review, 90(4), 807{828.
Jayachandran, S., and A. Lleras-Muney (2009): \Life Expectancy and Human Capital Investments:
Evidence from Maternal Mortality Declines," Quarterly Journal Economics, 124(1), 349{398.
Kalemli-Ozcan, S. (2003): \A Stochastic Model of Mortality, Fertility, and Human Capital Invest-
ment," Journal of Development Economics, 70(1), 103{118.
(2006): \AIDS, \Reversal" of the Demographic Transition and Economic Development: Evidence
from Africa," NBER Working Paper, 12181.
Lee, R. (2003): \The Demographic Transition: Three Centuries of Fundamental Change," Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 17(4), 167{190.
Livi-Bacci, M. (1992): A Concise History of World Population. Blackwell, Oxford.
Lorentzen, P., J. McMillan, and R. Wacziarg (2008): \Death and Development," Journal of
Economic Growth, 13(2), 81{124.
Maddison, A. (2003): The World Economy: Historical Statistics. OECD Development Centre, Paris.
Preston, S. H., P. Heuveline, and M. Guillot (2001): Demography: Measuring and Modeling
Population Processes. Blackwell, Oxford.
28Reher, D. S. (2004): \The Demographic Transition Revisited as a Global Process," Population, Space
and Place, 10(1), 19{41.
Shastry, G. K., and D. Weil (2003): \How Much of the Cross-Country Variation in Income is
Explained by Health?," Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(2-3), 387{396.
Skirbekk, V. (2008): \Fertility Trends by Social Status," Demographic Research, 18, 145{180.
Soares, R. (2005): \Mortality Reductions, Educational Attainment, and Fertility Choice," American
Economic Review, 95(3), 580{601.
Soto, M., and D. Cohen (2007): \Growth and human capital: Good data, good results," Journal of
Economic Growth, 12(1), 51{76.
Thomas, D., and E. Frankenberg (2002): \Health, Nutrition, and Prosperity: A Microeconomic
Perspective," Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 80(2), 106{113.
UN (1983): United Nations, Manual X: Indirect Techniques for Demographic Estimation. United Nations,
New York.
Weil, D. N. (2007): \Accounting for the Eect of Health on Economic Growth," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 122(3), 1265{1306.
29A Proofs and Tables





























































for fertility, respectively. Notice that there is also a possible corner solution in which no investments in
education are undertaken e








The interior solution with a positive level of education is optimal if and only if the indirect utility
is larger than the indirect utility that arises from the corner solution. This implies that education and
fertility are given by (23) and (24) if and only if they deliver an indirect utility which is larger than the
one obtained with e





























































Therefore if Tj < T, then the optimal interior investment in education (23) is not sucient to provide
an individual with as high a level of life time utility as that arising from supplying the baseline level of
human capital.
30Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Year Base Sample Pre-transitional Post-Transitional
Countries Countries
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Life expectancy at birth 1940 49.3 12.7 38.8 6.17 61.2 5.38
1980 67.6 7.41 62.3 6.25 73.7 1.70
2000 72.9 5.46 69.1 4.65 77.4 1.55
Predicted mortality 1940 0.47 0.28 0.65 0.23 0.27 0.17
Log GDP per capita 1940 7.74 0.73 7.21 0.50 8.34 0.39
1980 8.62 0.95 7.91 0.72 9.44 0.29
2000 8.96 0.96 8.22 0.68 9.81 0.32
Log Population 1940 9.11 1.53 9.03 1.80 9.20 1.20
1980 9.81 1.48 10.0 1.68 9.55 1.20
2000 10.1 1.49 10.4 1.63 9.67 1.21
Log GDP 1940 9.94 1.59 9.34 1.58 10.6 1.32
1980 11.5 1.49 11.0 1.49 12.1 1.31
2000 12.1 1.55 11.8 1.68 12.6 1.30
Sample sizes are 47 countries in the base sample, 25 pre-transitional countries and 22 post-transitional
countries. The classication follows criteria 1, 2 and 3 described in the text.
Table 2: Eect of Life Expectancy on Log GDP Per Capita
Observation Period Panel (A): 1940-1980
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a Income
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Non-Rich Rich
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log life expectancy -0.81*** -0.29 2.03*** -0.48 1.79*** -0.70* 1.73*** -1.17*** 4.34***
[0.26] [0.65] [0.44] [0.44] [0.52] [0.38] [0.46] [0.38] [0.92]
Number of countries 47 25 22 28 19 31 16 36 11
R2 0.14 0.01 0.35 0.03 0.27 0.07 0.29 0.16 0.40
Observation Period Panel (B): 1940-2000
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a Income
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Non-Rich Rich
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log life expectancy -1.14*** -1.95 2.15*** -1.56** 1.92** -1.23** 1.69** -1.82*** 1.72
[0.29] [1.14] [0.67] [0.75] [0.82] [0.50] [0.69] [0.44] [2.41]
Number of countries 47 25 22 28 19 31 16 36 11
R2 0.18 0.17 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.27 0.07
Results from OLS regressions, the dependent variable is log GDP per capita, lny. Robust, small sample corrected standard errors are
in brackets. All regressions are in long-dierence specications with two observations per country, for 1940 and 1980 in panel (A),
and for 1940 and 2000 in panel (B), respectively. All specications include a full set of year and country xed eects. The samples
in Panel (A) column (1) and Panel (B) column (1) correspond to the base sample of Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). Classication of
Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (2) and (3) is according to a country satisfying the three classication
criteria 1 (life expectancy at birth in 1940 being above 50), 2 (sustained fertility drop by 1935) and 3 (crude birth rate in 1940 being
below 30/1000) at the same time; the classication criterion 2 regarding the onset of the sustained fertility decline being prior to
1935 follows the classication of Reher (2004) in non-forerunner countries and forerunner countries, respectively. The classication of
Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (4) and (5) is according to criteria 1, 2a (same as 2 with Greece,
Ireland and New Zealand coded as pre-transitional) and 3. The classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940
in columns (6) and (7) is according to criteria 1, 2, and 3a (crude birth rate in 1940 being below 25/1000). The classication in rich
and non-rich countries in 1940 in columns (8) and (9) follows the classication by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the results in Panel
(A) column (8) and Panel (B) column (8) replicate their results in Table 9B(3) and 9B(4), respectively. ***, **,* indicate signicance
at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
31Table 3: Eect of Life Expectancy on Log Population
Observation Period Panel (A): 1940-1980
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a Income
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Non-Rich Rich
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log life expectancy 1.62*** 0.50 -0.53 1.13*** -0.28 1.05*** -0.12 1.86*** -3.00
[0.18] [0.38] [0.42] [0.38] [0.42] [0.23] [0.49] [0.24] [2.00]
Number of countries 47 25 22 28 19 31 16 36 11
R2 0.54 0.07 0.05 0.30 0.01 0.33 0.003 0.52 0.12
Observation Period Panel (B): 1940-2000
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a Income
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Non-Rich Rich
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log life expectancy 1.97*** 0.33 -0.79 1.31** -0.55 1.28*** -0.36 2.21*** -2.70
[0.22] [0.50] [0.50] [0.48] [0.52] [0.30] [0.60] [0.30] [2.87]
Number of countries 47 25 22 28 19 31 16 36 11
R2 0.55 0.02 0.06 0.28 0.03 0.32 0.02 0.51 0.06
Results from OLS regressions. The dependent variable in Table 2 is log GDP per capita, lny; the dependent variable in
Table 3 is log population, lnN. Robust, small sample corrected standard errors are in brackets. All regressions are in
long-dierence specications with two observations per country, for 1940 and 1980 in panel (A), and for 1940 and 2000
in panel (B), respectively. All specications include a full set of year and country xed eects. The samples in Panel
(A) column (1) and Panel (B) column (1) correspond to the base sample of Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). Classication
of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (2) and (3) is according to a country satisfying the
three classication criteria 1 (life expectancy at birth in 1940 being above 50), 2 (sustained fertility drop by 1935) and
3 (crude birth rate in 1940 being below 30/1000) at the same time; the classication criterion 2 regarding the onset of
the sustained fertility decline being prior to 1935 follows the classication of Reher (2004) in non-forerunner countries and
forerunner countries, respectively. The classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns
(4) and (5) is according to criteria 1, 2a (same as 2 with Greece, Ireland and New Zealand coded as pre-transitional) and 3.
The classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (6) and (7) is according to criteria
1, 2, and 3a (crude birth rate in 1940 being below 25/1000). The classication in rich and non-rich countries in 1940 in
columns (8) and (9) follows the classication by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the results in Panel (A) column (8) and
Panel (B) column (8) replicate their results in Table 9B(3) and 9B(4), respectively. ***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-,
and 10-percent level, respectively.
32Table 4: Causal Eect of Life Expectancy on Log GDP Per Capita
Observation Period Panel (A): 1940-1980
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a Income
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Non-Rich Rich
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log life expectancy -1.32*** -5.45 2.28*** -2.35* 2.23*** -1.72** 1.79* -2.35** 11.21*
[0.36] [5.48] [0.67] [1.35] [0.74] [0.69] [0.94] [0.79] [5.79]
Number of countries 47 25 22 28 19 31 16 36 11
Shea Partial R2 0.50 0.05 0.37 0.20 0.35 0.35 0.28 0.28 0.27
First Stage F-Stat. 47.3 1.2 5.5 5.4 4.8 14.3 3.4 13.8 3.7
Chow-Test: Equality of  p< 0:17 p< 0:01 p< 0:01 p< 0:02
Joint First Stage F-Stat. 7.28 8.05 8.40 9.19
Observation Period Panel (B): 1940-2000
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a Income
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Non-Rich Rich
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log life expectancy -1.51*** -5.28 2.74*** -3.14* 2.64*** -2.02** 1.83*** -2.68*** 14.25
[0.41] [3.22] [0.75] [1.62] [0.87] [0.92] [0.79] [0.96] [9.99]
Number of countries 47 25 22 28 19 31 16 36 11
Shea Partial R2 0.61 0.22 0.41 0.37 0.39 0.49 0.33 0.41 0.11
First Stage F-Stat. 60.2 5.7 6.5 10.9 5.8 23.0 4.2 21.8 2.0
Chow-Test: Equality of  p< 0:02 p< 0:01 p< 0:01 p< 0:09
Joint First Stage F-Stat. 7.37 8.22 12.77 13.09
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variable is log GDP per capita, lny, the instrument is predicted mortality change (see
text). Robust, small sample corrected standard errors are in brackets. All regressions are in long-dierence specications with two
observations per country, for 1940 and 1980 in panel (A), and for 1940 and 2000 in panel (B), respectively. All specications include a
full set of year and country xed eects. The samples in Panel (A) column (1) and Panel (B) column (1) correspond to the base sample
of Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the results replicate their results in Table 9B(1) and Table 9B(2), respectively. Classication of Pre-
Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (2) and (3) is according to a country satisfying the three classication
criteria 1 (life expectancy at birth in 1940 being above 50), 2 (sustained fertility drop by 1935) and 3 (crude birth rate in 1940 being
below 30/1000) at the same time; the classication criterion 2 regarding the onset of the sustained fertility decline being prior to
1935 follows the classication of Reher (2004) in non-forerunner countries and forerunner countries, respectively. The classication of
Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (4) and (5) is according to criteria 1, 2a (same as 2 with Greece,
Ireland and New Zealand coded as pre-transitional) and 3. The classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940
in columns (6) and (7) is according to criteria 1, 2, and 3a (crude birth rate in 1940 being below 25/1000). The classication in rich and
non-rich countries in 1940 in columns (8) and (9) follows the classication by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the results in Panel (A)
column (8) and Panel (B) column (8) replicate their results in Table 9B(3) and 9B(4), respectively. First stage F-tests correspond to
the partial F test of the instrument. F-Tests of the null of equality of  are Chow tests of equality of coecients in the two sub-samples,
conducted in a nested specication, F-statistics for the instrument on the rst stage of these specications are also reported as joint
rst stage F-tests. ***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
33Table 5: Causal Eect of Life Expectancy on Log Population
Observation Period Panel (A): 1940-1980
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a Income
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Non-Rich Rich
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log life expectancy 1.67*** -0.06 -1.14* 1.31 -1.09 1.07** -0.52 2.04*** 0.52
[0.34] [1.73] [0.57] [0.88] [0.63] [0.48] [0.56] [0.67] [6.33]
Number of countries 47 25 22 28 19 31 16 36 11
Shea Partial R2 0.50 0.05 0.37 0.20 0.35 0.35 0.28 0.28 0.27
First Stage F-Stat. 47.3 1.2 5.5 5.4 4.8 14.3 3.4 13.8 3.7
Chow-Test: Equality of  p< 0:56 p< 0:04 p< 0:04 p< 0:81
Joint First Stage F-Stat. 7.28 8.05 8.40 9.19
Observation Period Panel (B): 1940-2000
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a Income
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Non-Rich Rich
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log life expectancy 1.96*** 0.54 -1.61** 1.51* -1.58* 1.34*** -0.85 2.19*** 0.22
[0.36] [1.12] [0.75] [0.76] [0.81] [0.48] [0.78] [0.62] [12.3]
Number of countries 47 25 22 28 19 31 16 36 11
Shea Partial R2 0.61 0.22 0.41 0.37 0.39 0.49 0.33 0.41 0.11
First Stage F-Stat. 60.2 5.7 6.5 10.9 5.8 23.0 4.2 21.8 2.0
Chow-Test: Equality of  p< 0:12 p< 0:01 p< 0:03 p< 0:87
Joint First Stage F-Stat. 7.37 8.22 12.77 13.09
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variable is log population, lnN, the instrument is predicted mortality change
(see text). Robust, small sample corrected standard errors are in brackets. All regressions are in long-dierence specications
with two observations per country, for 1940 and 1980 in panel (A), and for 1940 and 2000 in panel (B), respectively. All
specications include a full set of year and country xed eects. The samples in Panel (A) column (1) and Panel (B) column
(1) correspond to the base sample of Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the results replicate their results in Table 9B(1) and Table
9B(2), respectively. Classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (2) and (3) is according
to a country satisfying the three classication criteria 1 (life expectancy at birth in 1940 being above 50), 2 (sustained fertility
drop by 1935) and 3 (crude birth rate in 1940 being below 30/1000) at the same time; the classication criterion 2 regarding the
onset of the sustained fertility decline being prior to 1935 follows the classication of Reher (2004) in non-forerunner countries
and forerunner countries, respectively. The classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns
(4) and (5) is according to criteria 1, 2a (same as 2 with Greece, Ireland and New Zealand coded as pre-transitional) and 3.
The classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (6) and (7) is according to criteria 1, 2,
and 3a (crude birth rate in 1940 being below 25/1000). The classication in rich and non-rich countries in 1940 in columns (8)
and (9) follows the classication by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the results in Panel (A) column (8) and Panel (B) column
(8) replicate their results in Table 8A(3) and 8A(4), respectively. First stage F-tests correspond to the partial F test of the
instrument. ***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
34Table 6: Causal Eect of Life Expectancy on Log GDP
Observation Period Panel (A): 1940-1980
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a Income
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Non-Rich Rich
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log life expectancy 0.31 -5.89 1.14 -1.17 1.15 -0.72 1.26 -0.39 11.73
[0.50] [6.47] [0.71] [1.58] [0.78] [0.87] [0.84] [0.93] [10.8]
Number of countries 47 25 22 28 19 31 16 36 11
Shea Partial R2 0.50 0.20 0.35 0.35 0.28 0.05 0.37 0.28 0.27
First Stage F-Stat. 47.3 1.2 5.5 5.4 4.8 14.3 3.4 13.8 3.7
Chow-Test: Equality of  p< 0:29 p< 0:20 p< 0:11 p< 0:25
Joint First Stage F-Stat. 7.28 8.05 8.40 9.19
Observation Period Panel (B): 1940-2000
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a Income
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Non-Rich Rich
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log life expectancy 0.42 -4.91* 1.13 -1.71 1.06 -0.74 0.99 -0.55 14.47
[0.37] [2.55] [0.89] [1.35] [1.04] [0.78] [0.83] [0.78] [16.9]
Number of countries 47 25 22 28 19 31 16 36 11
Shea Partial R2 0.61 0.41 0.41 0.37 0.39 0.49 0.33 0.22 0.11
First Stage F-Stat. 60.2 6.5 21.8 10.9 5.8 23.0 4.2 5.7 2.0
Chow-Test: Equality of  p< 0:03 p< 0:12 p< 0:14 p< 0:36
Joint First Stage F-Stat. 7.37 8.22 12.77 13.09
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variable is log GDP, lnY , the instrument is predicted mortality change (see
text). Robust, small sample corrected standard errors are in brackets. All regressions are in long-dierence specications
with two observations per country, for 1940 and 1980 in panel (A), and for 1940 and 2000 in panel (B), respectively. All
specications include a full set of year and country xed eects. The samples in Panel (A) column (1) and Panel (B) column
(1) correspond to the base sample of Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the results replicate their results in Table 9B(1) and Table
9B(2), respectively. Classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (2) and (3) is according
to a country satisfying the three classication criteria 1 (life expectancy at birth in 1940 being above 50), 2 (sustained fertility
drop by 1935) and 3 (crude birth rate in 1940 being below 30/1000) at the same time; the classication criterion 2 regarding the
onset of the sustained fertility decline being prior to 1935 follows the classication of Reher (2004) in non-forerunner countries
and forerunner countries, respectively. The classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns
(4) and (5) is according to criteria 1, 2a (same as 2 with Greece, Ireland and New Zealand coded as pre-transitional) and 3.
The classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (6) and (7) is according to criteria 1, 2,
and 3a (crude birth rate in 1940 being below 25/1000). The classication in rich and non-rich countries in 1940 in columns (8)
and (9) follows the classication by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the results in Panel (A) column (8) and Panel (B) column
(8) replicate their results in Table 9A(3) and 9A(4), respectively. First stage F-tests correspond to the partial F test of the
instrument. ***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
35Table 7: Eect of Life Expectancy on Population Share Without Schooling
Observation Period Panel (A): Schooling 1960-1980, Life Expectancy 1940-1980
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log life expectancy -0.43*** -0.05 -0.46*** -0.26** -0.47*** -0.34*** -0.37***
[0.06] [0.14] [0.12] [0.11] [0.15] [0.08] [0.07]
Number of countries 45 23 22 26 19 29 16
R2 0.53 0.004 0.63 0.17 0.60 0.29 0.67
Observation Period Panel (B): Schooling 1960-2000, Life Expectancy 1940-1980
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log life expectancy -0.81*** -0.27 -0.70*** -0.58*** -0.71** -0.69*** -0.51***
[0.08] [0.22] [0.24] [0.16] [0.29] [0.12] [0.13]
Number of countries 45 23 22 26 19 29 16
R2 0.63 0.05 0.56 0.29 0.53 0.42 0.58
Observation Period Panel (C): Schooling 1960-2000, Life Expectancy 1940-2000
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log life expectancy -0.73*** -0.46*** -0.69*** -0.62*** -0.68** -0.67*** -0.50***
[0.06] [0.16] [0.22] [0.09] [0.26] [0.08] [0.11]
Number of countries 45 23 22 26 19 29 16
R2 0.72 0.19 0.57 0.45 0.54 0.55 0.59
Results from OLS regressions, the dependent variable is the percentage of the population aged 15 or over
without schooling. Robust, small sample corrected standard errors are in brackets. All regressions are in
long-dierence specications with two observations per country. Panel (A) displays results for changes in
the share without schooling 1960-1980 on changes in life expectancy 1940-1980; panel (B) displays results
for changes in the share without schooling 1960-2000 on changes in life expectancy 1940-1980; Panel (C)
displays results for changes in the share without schooling 1960-2000 on changes in life expectancy 1940-2000.
Classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (2) and (3) is according
to a country satisfying the three classication criteria 1 (life expectancy at birth in 1940 being above 50), 2
(sustained fertility drop by 1935) and 3 (crude birth rate in 1940 being below 30/1000) at the same time;
the classication criterion 2 regarding the onset of the sustained fertility decline being prior to 1935 follows
the classication of Reher (2004) in non-forerunner countries and forerunner countries, respectively. The
classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (4) and (5) is according
to criteria 1, 2a (same as 2 with Greece, Ireland and New Zealand coded as pre-transitional) and 3. The
classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (6) and (7) is according
to criteria 1, 2, and 3a (crude birth rate in 1940 being below 25/1000). ***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-,
5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
36Table 8: Causal Eect of Life Expectancy on Population Share Without Schooling
Observation Period Panel (A): Schooling 1960-1980, Life Expectancy 1940-1980
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log life expectancy -0.46*** 0.63 -0.65*** -0.17 -0.68*** -0.36* -0.49***
[0.11] [1.04] [0.13] [0.33] [0.14] [0.21] [0.09]
Number of countries 45 23 22 26 19 29 16
Shea Partial R2 0.48 0.04 0.47 0.19 0.28 0.32 0.37
First Stage F-Stat. 43.5 0.8 5.5 5.8 4.8 13.2 3.4
Observation Period Panel (B): Schooling 1960-2000, Life Expectancy 1940-1980
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log life expectancy -0.95*** -0.46 -1.03*** -0.80** -1.07*** -0.92*** -0.70***
[0.13] [1.01] [0.25] [0.35] [0.28] [0.22] [0.15]
Number of countries 45 23 22 26 19 29 16
Shea Partial R2 0.48 0.04 0.47 0.19 0.28 0.32 0.37
First Stage F-Stat. 43.5 0.8 5.5 5.8 4.8 13.2 3.4
Observation Period Panel (C): Schooling 1960-2000, Life Expectancy 1940-2000
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log life expectancy -0.75*** -0.22 -0.94*** -0.54** -0.97*** -0.68*** -0.63***
[0.085] [0.46] [0.24] [0.22] [0.27] [0.15] [0.11]
Number of countries 45 23 22 26 19 29 16
Shea Partial R2 0.56 0.14 0.41 0.30 0.39 0.43 0.33
First Stage F-Stat. 54.1 3.4 6.5 8.8 5.8 19.8 4.3
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variable is the percentage of the population aged 15 or over
without schooling, the instrument is predicted mortality change (see text). Robust, small sample corrected
standard errors are in brackets. All regressions are in long-dierence specications with two observations
per country. Panel (A) displays results for changes in the share without schooling 1960-1980 on changes
in life expectancy 1940-1980; panel (B) displays results for changes in the share without schooling 1960-
2000 on changes in life expectancy 1940-1980; Panel (C) displays results for changes in the share without
schooling 1960-2000 on changes in life expectancy 1940-2000. Classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and
Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (2) and (3) is according to a country satisfying the three classication
criteria 1 (life expectancy at birth in 1940 being above 50), 2 (sustained fertility drop by 1935) and 3
(crude birth rate in 1940 being below 30/1000) at the same time; the classication criterion 2 regarding
the onset of the sustained fertility decline being prior to 1935 follows the classication of Reher (2004) in
non-forerunner countries and forerunner countries, respectively. The classication of Pre-Transitional in
1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (4) and (5) is according to criteria 1, 2a (same as 2 with
Greece, Ireland and New Zealand coded as pre-transitional) and 3. The classication of Pre-Transitional in
1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (6) and (7) is according to criteria 1, 2, and 3a (crude birth
rate in 1940 being below 25/1000). First stage F-tests correspond to the partial F test of the instrument.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39Table 11: Eect of Life Expectancy on the Probability of Entering the Demographic Transition
Observation Period Panel (A): 1940-1980
Criterion LEB > 50 Fert. Drop CBR< 30
1000 Sust.Fert.Drop CBR< 25
1000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log life expectancy 2.637*** 2.409*** 0.602 2.103*** -0.086
[0.345] [0.447] [0.421] [0.466] [0.295]
Number of countries 47 47 47 47 47
Number of transitions 0/1 24 20 8 23 3
Shea Partial R2 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
First Stage F-Stat. 47.3 47.3 47.3 47.3 47.3
Observation Period Panel (B): 1940-2000
Criterion LEB > 50 Fert. Drop CBR< 30
1000 Sust.Fert.Drop CBR< 25
1000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log life expectancy 2.204*** 2.204*** 1.768*** 1.960*** 0.41
[0.241] [0.241] [0.285] [0.279] [0.335]
Number of countries 47 47 47 47 47
Number of transitions 0/1 25 25 20 28 10
Shea Partial R2 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
First Stage F-Stat. 60.2 60.2 60.2 60.2 60.2
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variable is 1 if a country is satises the classication for a
post-transitional country and 0 if it does not satisfy the criterion; the instrument is predicted mortality
change (see text). Robust, small sample corrected standard errors are in brackets. All regressions are in
long-dierence specications with two observations per country, for 1940 and 1980 in panel (A), and for 1940
and 2000 in panel (B), respectively. All specications include a full set of year and country xed eects.
Classication of Pre-Transitional and Post-Transitional countries in columns (1), (2), (3) is according to
criteria 1 (life expectancy at birth above 50 ), 2 (sustained fertility drop), and 3 (crude birth rate below
30/1000), respectively. Classication in column (4) corresponds to criterion 2a (alternative coding of 3
countries); see also notes to Table 4. Classication in column (4) corresponds to a pre-transitional country
according to criteria 1, 2, and 3 that makes a substantial fertility transition (a drop of the crude birth rate
below 25/1000). First stage F-tests correspond to the partial F test of the instrument. ***, **,* indicate
signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
40Table 12: List of Countries and their Classication
Post-Transitional according to: Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a Rich
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Argentina ARG 1 1 0 0
Australia AUS 1 1 1 1
Austria AUT 1 1 1 0
Belgium BEL 1 1 1 1
Bangladesh BGD 0 0 0 0
Brazil BRA 0 0 0 0
Canada CAN 1 1 0 1
Switzerland CHE 1 1 1 1
Chile CHL 0 0 0 0
China CHN 0 0 0 0
Colombia COL 0 0 0 0
Costa Rica CRI 0 0 0 0
Germany DEU 1 1 1 1
Denmark DNK 1 1 1 1
Ecuador ECU 0 0 0 0
Spain ESP 1 1 1 0
Finland FIN 1 1 0 0
France FRA 1 1 1 0
United Kingdom GBR 1 1 1 1
Greece GRC 0 1 1 0
Guatemala GTM 0 0 0 0
Honduras HND 0 0 0 0
Indonesia IDN 0 0 0 0
India IND 0 0 0 0
Ireland IRL 0 1 1 0
Italy ITA 1 1 1 0
Korea Republic KOR 0 0 0 0
Sri Lanka LKA 0 0 0 0
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0
Myanmar MMR 0 0 0 0
Malaysia MYS 0 0 0 0
Nicaragua NIC 0 0 0 0
Netherlands NLD 1 1 0 1
Norway NOR 1 1 1 0
New Zealand NZL 0 1 0 1
Pakistan PAK 0 0 0 0
Panama PAN 0 0 0 0
Peru PER 0 0 0 0
Philippines PHL 0 0 0 0
Portugal PRT 1 1 0 0
Paraguay PRY 0 0 0 0
El Salvador SLV 0 0 0 0
Sweden SWE 1 1 1 1
Thailand THA 0 0 0 0
Uruguay URY 1 1 1 0
United States USA 1 1 1 1
Venezuela VEN 0 0 0 0
List of 47 countries that represent the baseline sample in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). \1"
indicates if a country is coded as post-transitional according to the respective criteria, \0"
corresponds to pre-transitional countries. Criteria 1, 2, 3 correspond to life expectancy at
birth > 50, sustainded fertility drop and a crude birth rate < 30
1000, respectively, by 1940.
Criterion 2a codes Greece, Ireland and New Zealand as pre-transitional due to the unclear
onset of their fertility drop. Criterion 3a considers a crude birth rate < 25
1000 rather than
< 30
1000. \Rich" uses the classication proposed by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). See also
main text for description of the classication criteria.
41Table 13: List of Countries and their Classication (Including Intermediate Countries)
LE> 50 Sust. Fert. Drop CBR< 30
1000
Post Intermediate Pre Post Intermediate Pre Post Intermediate Pre
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Argentina ARG 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Australia AUS 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Austria AUT 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Belgium BEL 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Bangladesh BGD 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
Brazil BRA 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Canada CAN 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Switzerland CHE 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Chile CHL 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
China CHN 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Colombia COL 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Costa Rica CRI 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Germany DEU 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Denmark DNK 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Ecuador ECU 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Spain ESP 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Finland FIN 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
France FRA 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
United Kingdom GBR 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Greece GRC 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Guatemala GTM 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
Honduras HND 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
Indonesia IDN 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
India IND 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Ireland IRL 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Italy ITA 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Korea Republic KOR 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Sri Lanka LKA 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Mexico MEX 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Myanmar MMR 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Malaysia MYS 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Nicaragua NIC 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
Netherlands NLD 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Norway NOR 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
New Zealand NZL 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Pakistan PAK 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Panama PAN 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Peru PER 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Philippines PHL 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Portugal PRT 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Paraguay PRY 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
El Salvador SLV 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Sweden SWE 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Thailand THA 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Uruguay URY 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
United States USA 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Venezuela VEN 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
List of 47 countries that represent the baseline sample in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). Classication according to criterion 1,
LE> 50, in 1940 and in 1980 in column (1), LE< 50 in 1940 and LE> 50 in 1980 in column (2), and LE< 50 in 1940 and in 1980 in
column (3). Classication according to criterion 2, sustained fertility drop, in 1940 and in 1980 in column (4), no sustained fertility
drop in 1940 but sustained fertility drop in 1980 in column (5), and no sustained fertility drop in 1940 and in 1980 in column (6).
Classication according to criterion 3, CBR< 30
1000, in 1940 and in 1980 in column (1), CBR> 30
1000 in 1940 and CBR< 30
1000 in
1980 in column (2), and CBR> 30
1000 in 1940 and in 1980 in column (3). See also main text for description of the classication
criteria.
42Table 14: Eect of Life Expectancy on Population Share Without Schooling
Observation Period Panel (A): Schooling 1960-1980, Life Expectancy 1940-1980
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log life expectancy -0.33*** 0.07 -0.51*** -0.15 -0.51*** -0.24** -0.46***
[0.06] [0.19] [0.10] [0.13] [0.12] [0.10] [0.08]
Number of countries 45 23 22 26 19 29 16
R2 0.37 0.01 0.67 0.05 0.63 0.15 0.68
Observation Period Panel (B): Schooling 1960-2000, Life Expectancy 1940-1980
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log life expectancy -0.76*** -0.01 -0.83*** -0.44** -0.83** -0.59*** -0.65***
[0.08] [0.19] [0.24] [0.18] [0.30] [0.14] [0.15]
Number of countries 45 23 22 26 19 29 16
R2 0.56 0.001 0.60 0.18 0.56 0.31 0.60
Observation Period Panel (C): Schooling 1960-2000, Life Expectancy 1940-2000
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log life expectancy -0.68*** -0.16 -0.81*** -0.46*** -0.80*** -0.56*** -0.64***
[0.07] [0.19] [0.22] [0.14] [0.26] [0.11] [0.13]
Number of countries 45 23 22 26 19 29 16
R2 0.62 0.03 0.61 0.26 0.57 0.40 0.61
Results from OLS regressions, the dependent variable is the percentage of the population aged 25 or over
without schooling. Robust, small sample corrected standard errors are in brackets. All regressions are in
long-dierence specications with two observations per country. Panel (A) displays results for changes in
the share without schooling 1960-1980 on changes in life expectancy 1940-1980; panel (B) displays results
for changes in the share without schooling 1960-2000 on changes in life expectancy 1940-1980; Panel (C)
displays results for changes in the share without schooling 1960-2000 on changes in life expectancy 1940-2000.
Classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (2) and (3) is according
to a country satisfying the three classication criteria 1 (life expectancy at birth in 1940 being above 50), 2
(sustained fertility drop by 1935) and 3 (crude birth rate in 1940 being below 30/1000) at the same time;
the classication criterion 2 regarding the onset of the sustained fertility decline being prior to 1935 follows
the classication of Reher (2004) in non-forerunner countries and forerunner countries, respectively. The
classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (4) and (5) is according
to criteria 1, 2a (same as 2 with Greece, Ireland and New Zealand coded as pre-transitional) and 3. The
classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (6) and (7) is according
to criteria 1, 2, and 3a (crude birth rate in 1940 being below 25/1000). ***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-,
5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
43Table 15: Causal Eect of Life Expectancy on Population Share Without Schooling
Observation Period Panel (A): Schooling 1960-1980, Life Expectancy 1940-1980
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log life expectancy -0.34*** 0.96 -0.71*** 0.01 -0.73*** -0.22 -0.62***
[0.12] [1.00] [0.10] [0.37] [0.11] [0.23] [0.12]
Number of countries 45 23 22 26 19 29 16
Shea Partial R2 0.48 0.04 0.47 0.19 0.28 0.32 0.37
First Stage F-Stat. 43.5 0.8 5.5 5.8 4.8 13.2 3.4
Observation Period Panel (B): Schooling 1960-2000, Life Expectancy 1940-1980
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log life expectancy -0.87*** 0.57 -1.20*** -0.47 -1.24*** -0.75** -0.89***
[0.17] [1.24] [0.24] [0.50] [0.28] [0.31] [0.18]
Number of countries 45 23 22 26 19 29 16
Shea Partial R2 0.48 0.04 0.47 0.19 0.28 0.32 0.37
First Stage F-Stat. 43.5 0.8 5.5 5.8 4.8 13.2 3.4
Observation Period Panel (C): Schooling 1960-2000, Life Expectancy 1940-2000
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log life expectancy -0.69*** 0.27 -1.10*** -0.32 -1.12*** -0.55** -0.80***
[0.12] [0.58] [0.22] [0.33] [0.26] [0.22] [0.14]
Number of countries 45 23 22 26 19 29 16
Shea Partial R2 0.56 0.14 0.41 0.30 0.39 0.43 0.33
First Stage F-Stat. 54.1 3.4 6.5 8.8 5.8 19.8 4.3
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variable is the percentage of the population aged 25 or over
without schooling, the instrument is predicted mortality change (see text). Robust, small sample corrected
standard errors are in brackets. All regressions are in long-dierence specications with two observations
per country. Panel (A) displays results for changes in the share without schooling 1960-1980 on changes
in life expectancy 1940-1980; panel (B) displays results for changes in the share without schooling 1960-
2000 on changes in life expectancy 1940-1980; Panel (C) displays results for changes in the share without
schooling 1960-2000 on changes in life expectancy 1940-2000. Classication of Pre-Transitional in 1940 and
Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (2) and (3) is according to a country satisfying the three classication
criteria 1 (life expectancy at birth in 1940 being above 50), 2 (sustained fertility drop by 1935) and 3
(crude birth rate in 1940 being below 30/1000) at the same time; the classication criterion 2 regarding
the onset of the sustained fertility decline being prior to 1935 follows the classication of Reher (2004) in
non-forerunner countries and forerunner countries, respectively. The classication of Pre-Transitional in
1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (4) and (5) is according to criteria 1, 2a (same as 2 with
Greece, Ireland and New Zealand coded as pre-transitional) and 3. The classication of Pre-Transitional in
1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (6) and (7) is according to criteria 1, 2, and 3a (crude birth
rate in 1940 being below 25/1000). First stage F-tests correspond to the partial F test of the instrument.
***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
44Table 16: Causal Eect of Life Expectancy on Average Years of Schooling
Observation Period Panel (A): Schooling 1960-1980, Life Expectancy 1940-1980
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log life expectancy -1.72** -12.9 -0.41 -3.54 -0.19 -2.58 -1.70
[0.64] [14.1] [1.31] [3.14] [1.36] [1.60] [1.57]
Number of countries 45 23 22 26 19 29 16
Shea Partial R2 0.48 0.04 0.47 0.19 0.28 0.32 0.37
First Stage F-Stat. 43.5 0.8 5.5 5.8 4.8 13.2 3.4
Observation Period Panel (B): Schooling 1960-2000, Life Expectancy 1940-1980
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log life expectancy 0.85 -20.8 7.47** -4.62 8.10* -2.04 10.1*
[1.24] [22.7] [3.34] [5.35] [3.88] [2.88] [5.01]
Number of countries 45 23 22 26 19 29 16
Shea Partial R2 0.48 0.04 0.47 0.19 0.28 0.32 0.37
First Stage F-Stat. 43.5 0.8 5.5 5.8 4.8 13.2 3.4
Observation Period Panel (C): Schooling 1960-2000, Life Expectancy 1940-2000
Classication Criterion Criteria 1, 2, 3 Criteria 1, 2a, 3 Criteria 1, 2, 3a
Sample All Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log life expectancy 0.67 -9.82 6.87** -3.14 7.33** -1.51 9.13**
[0.97] [7.80] [2.86] [3.56] [3.23] [2.13] [4.06]
Number of countries 45 23 22 26 19 29 16
Shea Partial R2 0.56 0.14 0.41 0.30 0.39 0.43 0.33
First Stage F-Stat. 54.1 3.4 6.5 8.8 5.8 19.8 4.3
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variable is the average years of schooling in the population
aged 15-64 that is not in education, the instrument is predicted mortality change (see text). Robust, small
sample corrected standard errors are in brackets. All regressions are in long-dierence specications with
two observations per country. Panel (A) displays results for changes in the share without schooling 1960-
1980 on changes in life expectancy 1940-1980; panel (B) displays results for changes in the share without
schooling 1960-2000 on changes in life expectancy 1940-1980; Panel (C) displays results for changes in the
share without schooling 1960-2000 on changes in life expectancy 1940-2000. Classication of Pre-Transitional
in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (2) and (3) is according to a country satisfying the three
classication criteria 1 (life expectancy at birth in 1940 being above 50), 2 (sustained fertility drop by 1935)
and 3 (crude birth rate in 1940 being below 30/1000) at the same time; the classication criterion 2 regarding
the onset of the sustained fertility decline being prior to 1935 follows the classication of Reher (2004) in
non-forerunner countries and forerunner countries, respectively. The classication of Pre-Transitional in
1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (4) and (5) is according to criteria 1, 2a (same as 2 with
Greece, Ireland and New Zealand coded as pre-transitional) and 3. The classication of Pre-Transitional in
1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 in columns (6) and (7) is according to criteria 1, 2, and 3a (crude birth
rate in 1940 being below 25/1000). First stage F-tests correspond to the partial F test of the instrument.
***, **,* indicate signicance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
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Classication according to criteria 1, 2, 3, see Table 12 and main text for detailed description
of the classication criteria.
Figure 4: Income and Population Dynamics in Pre-Transitional and Post-Transitional Countries
ln Population (in 1000)
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Classication according to criteria 1, 2, 3, see Table 12 and main text for detailed description
of the classication criteria.
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Classication according to criteria 1, 2, 3, see Table 12 and main text for detailed description
of the classication criteria.
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Classication according to criteria 1, 2, 3, see Table 12 and main text for detailed description
of the classication criteria.
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